The German Tribune

[...], 6 December 1981
[...] Year - No. 1015 - By air

A WEEKLY REVIEW OF THE GERMAN PRESS

C 20725 C
ISSN 0016-8858

EEC leaders fail in bid to solve farm, cash issues



[...]appointment reigned in Western [E]urope at the apparent failure of [the s]ummit of Common Market heads of [gover]nment in London.

[No] solutions were found to the fun[dame]ntal problems facing the EEC: re[form] of the Common Agricultural Poli[cy an]d a more equitable distribution of [the C]ommunity's cost.

[Thi]s meant that for the time being [nothi]ng can be done to combat unem[ploy]ment in the medium term or to [the] development of Western Europe's [...] areas, on both of which agree[ment] was reached in principle.

[Th]e Ecu, or European currency unit, [can]'t be spent twice. As long as most [of the] European Community's funds are [sunk] in the bottomless pit of farm [...] there will be no way in which the [...] budget can foot the bill for [closin]g the technological gap by which [the C]ommon Market lags behind Amer[ica an]d Japan.

[O]nly those who expect miracles to [...] in politics can really have been [disap]pointed by the conference.

[It] was a surprising step forward for [peop]le like Chancellor Schmidt, Presi[dent] Mitterrand and Mrs Thatcher to

[...] as delve they must, into the small [...] of safeguards for the farming [comm]unity established by EEC Agricul[ture M]inisters over the past 20 years.

[He]rr Schmidt, a Social Democrat, and [Mrs] Thatcher, a Tory, will have come to [se]e that even a Socialist President of [Franc]e has to satisfy voters who are [...]d wine-growers and farmers.

[By] the same token M. Mitterrand and [the] other Common Market heads of [gover]nment must have appreciated that [they] were going to have to choose be-

tween industrial progress or the agricultural policy status quo between now and the next summit in terms of EEC funds.

The Foreign Ministers of the Ten are unlikely to succeed before Christmas (or, for that matter, in January) in arriving at an overall compromise the London summit failed to reach on what EEC Commission president Gaston Thorn of Luxembourg has termed the second-generation European Community.

So decisions cannot be expected to be taken until the next EEC summit in spring. By then the next round of farm price rises will have been agreed by the Agriculture Ministers.

This will mean, as the 10 heads of government cannot fail to have realised, the loss of a further year in which agricultural policy might have been reformed.

M. Thorn expressly pointed out this danger. He and the Brussels Commission provided, with their partly specific, partly somewhat vague proposals, the basic direction of preparations for the London summit by the standing committee of EEC ambassadors and the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Incidentally, no Common Market summit had ever before been as meticulously prepared as this one.

Given its failure one may wonder what point there is in the three summits a year for EEC heads of government on which agreement was reached in 1974. The European Community head of government who has been in office longest, Bonn's Helmut Schmidt, feels a regular exchange of view three time a year is of incalculable value. Public opinion would do well to stop expecting Euro-summits to achieve major results. Yet the Bonn government has just launched Foreign Minister Genscher's bid for progress towards a European Union, and he envisages the European Council or summit meeting of the 10 heads of government, emerging as the Community's centre of political decision. Ever since three summits a year have been held, EEC Council of Ministers in all departments have taken to shelving basic disputes for consideration by the European Council.

The Euro-summit then re-entrusts the Councils of Ministers with finding a solution (which was exactly what happened at the London summit).

If the summit is truly to emerge as the decision-maker on fundamental issues, a Euro-summit such as the Lancaster House gathering would need to be held over four days rather than two.

But that would make expectations even greater and failure to reach agreement would have even more far-reaching psychological consequences.

The London summit was not really a failure, or will not have been one if the 10 EEC leaders were to reach a political decision to ensure that compromise formulas were found at forthcoming meetings of the Council of Ministers.


A fundamental rerequisite for the success of the European Community is that everyone must be equally dissatisfied with every step forward but that no-one must be a loser.

That is why Anglo-German dreams of a Common Agricultural Policy almost free of charge (something not to be found in any modern industrialised country) are just as unrealistic as other EEC countries's hopes of being able to live better before long by virtue of Germany's contribution to the Common Market's kitty.

Nowhere is there more truth in the adage that politics is heavy going than in efforts to promote Western European integration. So let us be patient!

Erich Hauser

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 30 November 1981)



(Cartoon: Hanel/Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland)



Hamburg briefing

The head of the American negotiating team in Geneva, Paul Nitze had talks in Germany before going on to Switzerland. Here he takes a break with the Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, and his wife, Loki, at their Hamburg home. (Photo: dpa)

IN THIS ISSUE

[TH]E GERMAN TRIBUNE is conduc[ting] a readership survey. With some [copi]es this week a postcard is included. [Plea]se fill it in and return as quickly as [poss]ible. DO NOT fill in the card if [you] have already done so this year.

■ SOCIETY

Therapy instead of jail basis of new drug law

The new Narcotics Act comes into force in the New Year. It was intended to make life easier for drug addicts, but in practice it is another matter.

Andreas, 26, was firmly resolved to break his heroin addiction. He spent more than 18 months trying to arrange for a place at a Salem clinic.

It was hard work because there are not many places available. But he made telephone calls, wrote letters, had an interview, paid the clinic several visits and did not let matters rest.

On 20 September 1981 he made it. After being associated with narcotics since the age of 13 and twice having been put on cold turkey by the courts he finally gained admission to a long-term therapy course.

But it was all over in little more than a fortnight. Four plain-clothed police officers arrived with a warrant and took him back to investigative custody in Gütersloh.

He stood accused in Gütersloh of having cannabis resin and heroin in his possession and of dealing in them.

Chief public prosecutor Hanse in Bielefeld says the decision to arrest him was taken after careful consideration. He admits that it was, perhaps, a borderline case and certainly somewhat unusual.

The Salem clinic says it was purely and simply a scandal.

At first glance this case might appear to have been an unfortunate mishap, but on closer scrutiny it may not, says Bonn lawyer Rüdiger Böhm, be the rule, but it is by no means uncommon.

Herr Böhm specialises in defending people accused of narcotics offences.

Two similar cases were reported in one month to Alexander Eberth, a Munich lawyer who heads the Drugs and Narcotics Association, which helps to coordinate the activities of 30 organisations that help addicts.

In one of the two cases a patient was arested and taken into investigative custody after he had already undergone therapy for six months.

It is hard to say how often the heavy hand of the law descends in this way. Not even the Addiction Association in Darmstadt keeps figures on the subject; it is not prepared to hazard a guess either.

In practice they are kept under wraps and quietly dealt with by the legal authorities, lawyers and local government departments.

Staff at the Salem therapy centre are more explicit. Their clinic has been in existence for the past nine years. It is based on anthroposophical principles and has an excellent reputation.

They say the case initially mentioned is in clear contradiction of the therapy-not-imprisonment formula on which the new Narcotics Act is based.

The Act does not come into force until the New Year, but this principle has been part and parcel of practical treatment of drug cases for some time.

People who work with drug addicts have mixed feelings about the Act. They range from misgivings to anxiety.

Heinrich Breuer, head of the Cologne centre for social therapy, reckons the politicians have scored a king-sized own goal this time.

Alexander Eberth in Munich is less upset. "It's no great shakes," he says, "but we could have had a better one."

Criticism is first levelled at the term "a not inconciderable quantity." People caught in possession of this quantity of narcotics will be liable to not less than two years' imprisonment.

Whatever the term means, experts are convinced it means a change for the worse. "A not inconsiderable quantity," the courts currently rule, is for instance more than 1.6 grams of heroin.

Yet a heroin addict who deals in the drug to earn his own daily shot has to mix and sell between six and 10 grams of heroin to get together a gram for himself self.

Addicts have few ways in which they can hope to finance their addiction. They can deal, break in at chemists or go in for felony of other kinds.

"Most of the addicts who peddle drugs for a living will no longer come within the scope of the Act," says Herr Breuer.

Therapy not imprisonment will apply to those who face less than two years in gaol, whereas the dealer just described will stand to be sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

But the courts already have wide powers of discretion, and the Act does not necessarily reduce the leeway that is the bench's privilege.

There. have been times when possession of a quarter of a gram of heroin have been enough to put an addict behind bars for three years.

Yet on another occasion an offender in possession of 50 grams of heroin has got away with a 10-month sentence.

The new Act pays no attention to a demand social workers have made for years. It is that an addict ought not to face punishment for getting hold of narcotics for his own use.

But the Act makes no distinction between an addict who buys his own and a peddler who earns a living from the addiction others suffer from.

Herr Eberth agrees with the general criticism and feels the lawmakers would have done well to include in the new Act a declaration of intent.

What he has in mind is a declaration that would provide judges with a basis for drawing a distinction between the addict and the drug peddler.

The third point that has come in for criticism is that no distinction is drawn between hard and soft drugs. A teenager who buys marijuana or cannabis resin for himself and his friends can easily have 20 grams on his hands.

This is clearly a "not inconsiderable quantity" and the offender will be punished on the strength of criteria that also apply to hard drugs such as heroin or opium.

The outcome is that the hypothetical teenager stands no likelihood of undergoing therapy either. He too will be sent straight to gaol.

"But it is important to draw a distinction," says Herr Breuer. "First, hashish is easy to come by. Second, children and young people do not feel they are doing something illegal.

"They will soup up a moped without feeling they are doing something wrong and smoke a joint with an equally easy conscience — rather than getting drunk."

Herr Eberth does not see this omission as a serious problem. He says case law has already made a clear distinction between hard and soft drugs.

Drug advice centres see tough problems ahead for them. They are something of an anomaly as it is, seen as suspicious by society and as suspicious by virtue of representing society by the addict.

Their status has been rendered even odder by the new Act. "Persons or institutions treating addicts," it reads, "will notify the legal authorities whenever therapy is abandoned."

Therapists argue that this requirement makes them deputies to the law enforcement agencies. Besides, abandonment of a course of treatment can be the fault of the centre that provides the treatment.

This point is made by Herr Breuer, but the law as it will shortly stand rules that addicts who abandon therapy are liable to serve any prison sentences that might be outstanding.

In the past advice centres have been able to reassure suspicious clients that they work anonymously, notifying neither the police nor the courts.

This argument is now unlikely to be believed, many therapists are afraid. They feel their work will be made more

Continued on page 15

Alcohol costs more in human and cash terms

Last year people in the Federal R[e]public of Germany spent ne[…] DM 59.3bn on alcohol and tobacco. T[…] was roughly DM 900m more than […] 1979.

Taxes of one kind and another […] counted for about DM 17bn of this to[…]

Alcohol, says an addiction centre […] Hamm, Westphalia, is the most sign[…] cant addictive drug in the country.

Every man, woman and child in G[…] many downed 12.67 litres of pure al[…] hol in 1980, or slightly less than t[…] 1979 per capita intake of 12.74 litres.

Even so, that still means a statisti[…] monthly average of 1.06 litres of p[…] alcohol, or about 30 grams a day.

Spending on alcoholic drinks total[…] DM 39.1bn, which was an increase […] DM 100m on the previous year.

There have been no major reali[…] ments in drinking habits. Beer drinki[…] for instance, remained steady at 14[…] litres per head a year (as against 14[…] in 1979).

Wine consumption has increas[…] however, from 333.2 million bottles […] 1979 to 358.8 million bottles last year.

The tax claw-back from spending […] alcoholic drinks totalled a h[…] DM 5.7bn.

There are an estimated 1.5m to 1[…] alcoholics, with women making up […] per cent and juveniles and young peo[…] about 10 per cent of the total.

The cost of medical treatment for […] coholics is steadily increasing. Last y[…] the health insurance schemes pai[…] about 14,000 people to be sent to ho[…] to dry out.

This treatment cost approximat[…] DM 280m.

Smoking is on the increase too. T[…] number of cigarettes that went up […] smoke last year was up from 126bn […] over 128bn.

It cost the smokers about DM 20.2[…] of which the taxman retriev[…] DM 11.3bn or so. Statistically speakin[…] per capital consumption of cigarett[…] over the year was 2,085.

There are also an estimated 60,000 h[…] roin addicts in the country. Dr[…] offences increased from 51,435 in 19[…] to 62,395 in 1980.

dpa

(Kölner Stadt Anzeiger, 7 November 19[…])

Suicide aid for fallout victims sought

People facing a slow and painful death from nuclear fallout should be provided with some means of committing suicide, says a German group which favours humane death.

The *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Humanes Sterben* makes this demand in an open letter to Bonn Interior Minister Gerhart Baum, whose department is responsible for civil defence, and to the Interior Ministers of the *Länder*.

It says the country is prepared neither for a reactor catastrophe nor for a nuclear war, and even if the best precautions were taken it would be utopian to expect health services to be maintained for tens of millions of people.

If an atomic bomb were to fall on, say, Hamburg there would be between 200,000 and 300,000 serious fallout victims competing for a mere 30 hospital beds specially equipped to handle people with severe burns, and the 30 beds were scattered all over the country.

There ought at the very least to be 250 bed, the group says.

A civil defence brochure for which Herr Baum wrote a preface is said to be ludicrous. It suggests aluminium-clad foil is a suitable shield to protect people from the nuclear heat wave.

Civil defence units should be equipped with suicide pills instead. This was essential from the viewpoints of both common sense and humanity.

The group, which has been in existence for just over a year and claims to have about 1,000 members, feels its most important accomplishment so far has been to draw up a last will and testament for patients.

On a variety of printed forms patients can state in advance what they would like to be done if they were in a condition verging on the hopeless in which they were unable to explain what they wanted.

They could either call for no medi[…] efforts to be spared or for life-sustaini[…] drugs or treatment to be stopped whe[…] as far as could reasonably be told, the[…] were on the point of death.

Members of the group hope in th[…] way to decide, in appropriate circum[…] stances, of their own free will when the[…] are to die: by refusing further medic[…] assistance.

In another open letter to the parli[…] mentary party leaders in the Bonn Bu[…] destag the group calls for a Bill to rev[…] Paragraph 216 of the criminal code.

The amendment it has in mind wou[…] entitle everyone to both active and p[…] sive help to die if they so wished wh[…] not obliging any member of the medi[…] profession to lend a hand.

"We are not a suicide movement," t[…] letter states. But if death might be t[…] lief and the doctor was not able to p[…] vide it, people should be entitled to […] cide for themselves.

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 7 November, 19[…])

[…]RIME

Borders are no obstacle to the hired killer

[…]ppened on the dance floor of a […]furt nightclub. The murderer, an […]who had landed in Germany only […]hours earlier, went straight to his […]and stabbed him 12 times. Death […]ant.

[…] before the police could go into […] the Italian was on his way back […]

[…] were no personal ties between […]urderer and the victim. The Italian […]hired killer working for a crime […]ate.

[…] police later found out that the […] was involved in international […]d smuggling and that he had […]crossed his principals.

[…] killer was subsequently caught […]tenced. But despite the police ef[…]thing was learned about the syn[…]behind him.

[…] was only one of the cases which […]furt Public Prosecutor Adelheid […], who heads the organised crime […]ment, cited at an international […]nce organised by the Federal […] for Criminal Investigation (BKA) […]ve that syndicated crime was […]g to Germany.

[…] type of criminal organisation […]use of the most sophisticated of […] communications, and only the […]ss are familiar with the complete […]d its activities.

[…] syndicates use many specialists […]how neither each other nor their […]als.

[…]national flight schedules play a […] part.

[…] robbery is planned in West Ger[…], the men are flown in and out […] often before the police have even […]d about it.

[…] the case of murder, the victim's […] routine is carefully recorded to […] the assassination fit the airline […]ules.

[…]onal frontiers are no obstacle, but […]s for national police forces.

[…]r eight years at the head of her […]ment, Frau Werner had to con[…] that "all the big fellows are still at […]

But she also told the conference that her office was successful in hampering the work of these gangs and in bringing some of the smaller organisations to book.

The objective of organised crime, to make the biggest profit in the shortest time, calls for thorough "market research".

Cash, diamonds and precious metals are the easiest commodities to deal with.

Dealers in stolen cars and arms (the cars are usually expensive and stolen on order) require highly trained staff.

Frau Werner also told about specialising in the theft of meat.

The public prosecutor's report to the conference coincided with the conclusion of experts that there is a close link between the growing number of foreigners in this country — and particularly asylum seekers — and organised crime.

Bonn's commissioner for aliens' affairs, Liselotte Funcke, warned against hasty conclusions, generalisations and over-simplifications that could promote xenophobia.

She pointed to the difficult position of young foreigners in particular — people caught between widely differing cultures.

But the experts remained unimpressed by the possible political consequences and stuck to their pessimistic outlook.

According to Frau Werner, there are no Mafia-type gangs in this country — as yet. This is due to the fact that we do not have the crass differences between rich and poor that have driven whole sections of southern Italy's population into crime.

But there was a danger, she said, that the growing number of asylum seekers could create a new sub-proletariat. Due to these asylum seekers — especially those who come for economic reasons — Germany is in fact an immigration country.

Growing unemployment and diminishing economic opportunity make the huge mass of underprivileged foreigners - especially in the cities — a dangerous compost heap for organised crime.

There are more and more indications that foreign syndicates are spreading to



Adelheid Werner . . . 'sign that organised syndicates are organising.'

(Photo: dpa)

this country, establishing strongholds and seeking out victims.

Police officers are overtaxed and are calling for political solutions.

But the police experts, whose minds are riveted on individual cases, tend to overlook the fact that the vast majority of the foreigners among us are decent and law-abiding.

The Wiesbaden conference was emphatic in calling for an integration of our foreigners as a sort of patent cure. But nobody was able to say how this was to be achieved.

Stefan Geiger

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 11 November 1981)

Continued from page 14

[…]lt despite references to persons or […]tions treating addicts.

[…]ice centres are not affected by the […]ules, Herr Eberth says, whereas […] Breuer is worried that if they are […]ed to work in conjunction with […] enforcement agencies they might […] well call it a day.

[…] the case initially mentioned the […]d not want to have anything to do […] the social workers. Two Salem staff […]panied Andreas to the Gütersloh […] and wanted to address the court […] his client's behalf.

[…] the judge decided to rely on his […]d did not even call in the case […]ers who had come all the way from […]-Württemberg to help, he left […] to stand outside in the corridor.

[…]m lawyer Ernst Johann lodged a […]plaint with a Bielefeld court, but the […]plaint was dismissed. A higher court […]Hamm, Westphalia, is to rule on the […]d shortly.

Michael Rupprecht

([…]lner Stadt-Anzeiger, 13 November 1981)

Hunt for social answers 'a failure'

Crime is steadily increasing despite huge efforts at social work, a conference has been told.

Never before had Germany done more in the social sector, said the head of the Hesse criminal investigation branch, Vorbeck.

One speaker said foreigners pushed the crime rate up. They formed only 7.5 per cent of the population but comprised 15 per cent of suspects.

Policemen, lawyers and other criminal experts from several countries attended the conference, in Wiesbaden.

Delegates agreed that crime in Germany would keep on rising. But they could not say why.

Lower Saxony's Justice Minister, Hans-Dietrich Schwind, who is a professor of criminology, said that we don't even know why a person does not commit a crime, let alone why he does.

One speaker stressed that the possible reason could be upbringing. Today's children needed "moral rearmament."

He also said that schools should teach courtesy, discipline and industriousness.

A federal prosecutor said a great many teachers and university professors should be screened. He doubted their loyalty to the Constitution.

"As long as enemies of the Constitution are permitted to teach, we must not expect sound values to be conveyed," he said.

Bonn Justice Minister Jürgen Schmude disagreed. He was reluctant to go along with the general trend and put the blame on the schools. He stressed the importance of the home, saying that in cases of broken families it was up to the authorities to look after the children.

The minister also called for more effective youth assistance, though conceding that this would be costly.

A sound social policy, Herr Schmude said, was still the best crime prevention.

A police officer pointed out that North American crime statistics showed that spending money on youth work did not pay.

Vorbeck argued along the same lines, saying that never before had Germany done more in the social sector and yet the number of crimes has been rising steadily.

There are three to four times as many juvenile foreigners below the age of 18 involved in crimes of violence (robbery, murder and rape) than Germans in the same age group.

Frankfurt Public Prosecutor Adelheid Werner told the meeting that Germany has so far been spared organised crime syndicates along the lines of the Mafia; but there are signs that this type of crime is spreading to this country. It appears that organised gangs operating abroad are establishing strongholds in Germany.

There is hardly a trick professional criminals don't know, she said. Pimps have even found ways and means of bringing Latin American prostitutes to Frankfurt.

They first fly the girls to Italy, where they arrange for them to marry ancient men in old folk's homes. This made them automatically Italian citizens with all the privileges of the European Community, including freedom to work in any Community country.

Police officers said foreigners are not deported after they have committed a serious crime.

Justice Minister Schmude rebutted this, pointing to cases where foreigners were deported because they were found twice driving without a licence.

One of the main point of criticism by police officers was the growing violence in connection with demonstrations.

Günter Ermisch of the Bonn Interior Ministry said that the public had grown used to dangerous conditions to the point where such crimes as arson receive no public attention.

In fact, violence is no longer seen as abnormal. On the contrary, many people consider themselves entitled to commit such acts because they know no other way of attracting attention.

Another speaker summed this up, saying: "Democracy is a form of government in which those who scream loudest get their way."

Ermisch said that the fact that the activities of left wing groupings led to counter-measures by their opponents entailed a serious danger to public safety.

Such militia-like groupings must not be underestimated, and the state's power monopoly must be upheld for the sake of peace. Any compromise here would be dangerous.

Lower Saxony's Justice Minister Schwind called for preventive measures, for instance through social workers at police stations.

Once the law has been broken, the penalties must be stiff to increase the risk to the criminal.

Herr Schwind said: "If Herr Schmude and I were to plan a burglary, we would not think of the penalty but only of getting caught."

Though the meeting dealt with its stocktaking and forecasts with the earnestness such a subject deserves, there was also some levity.

When Frankfurt's public prosecutor complained that the use of housing in the city's railway station district for prostitution was treated as a misdemeanour, saying "... after all, we all know the brothels are there," the audience laughed uproariously, but nobody contradicted her.

Alfred Behr

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 13 November 1981)

■ WORLD AFFAIRS

Brezhnev in Bonn: attempt to build bridges

The Soviet leaders' talks in Bonn were overshadowed by the superpowers' Geneva talks on medium-range missiles, which began a few days later.

They served as a preliminary to the Geneva talks in two ways: internally as a means by which the two sides could brief each other, outwardly in a bid to influence European public opinion.

European opinion was one of the targets aimed at by President Reagan in his TV broadcast on 18 November. The battle for hearts and minds is in full swing.

The meetings between Mr Brezhnev and Herr Schmidt were, along with the consultations between Foreign Ministers Gromyko and Genscher, the last East-West talks before the superpowers conferred in Geneva.

They were a last opportunity of discussing the Geneva disarmament agenda at the highest level beforehand, an opportunity of making direct declarations of political intent.

For one last time each side's objectives, be they a zero option or a moratorium, could be fully contrasted in the full spotlight of world attention.

Experts and delegations would then get down to detailed negotiations and thus vanish from the full glare of international publicity for the time being.

Both sides in Bonn made great play with the advantage they alone enjoy in the complex context of East-West ties: continuity of both political and personal relations.

Helmut Schmidt and Hans-Dietrich Genscher have been in office for 12 years in Bonn, for the past seven as Chancellor and Foreign Minister respectively.

Except for Canada's Mr Trudeau, who has not held office throughout, they are the oldest foreign policy hands Nato has.

They and the Soviet leaders are, in each other's eyes, what both hold to be particularly important: they are predictable.

Ties between Bonn and Moscow are thus the exact opposite of what Soviet-US ties, marked by ill-will and suspicion, have been for some time.

There is not a Nato country to match the Federal Republic for its close ties with the Soviet Union at all levels of communication.

This autumn's visitors to Moscow have included Willy Brandt, Heinz-Oskar Vetter, the trade union leader, and Johannes Rau, the Premier of North Rhine-Westphalia.

They are leading West German public figures by any yardstick. Other politicians to have sounded out the lie of the land in Moscow include Bundestag MPs Egon Bahr and Walther Leisler Kiep.

This is no way alters the fact that Moscow's main adversary and partner is Washington and that, from the Soviet point of view, ties with the Americans have not really been satisfactory since 1974, when Dr Kissinger left the State Department.

Chancellor Schmidt himself has not always felt US foreign policy over the past four or five years to be right, or let us say, convincing.

He is certainly a statesman whose view of the situation is bound at least to interest the Soviet Union.

His explanation of President Reagan's zero solution offensive may well have proved useful to the Soviet leaders.

When one bears in mind that the Chancellor is bound to have learnt more behind closed doors about Mr Brezhnev's latest variation on his moratorium offer than the Soviet leader disclosed in public, this alone will have made the Bonn talks worthwhile.

Both sides need to know whether the other plans to be flexible in Geneva and if so, in what respect.

The Soviet tenet of approximate parity as of 30 November 1981 is a maximum stand taken with Geneva in mind. So is the zero solution envisaged by the US government.

The current American version of the zero option is that all Soviet SS-20 missiles must be scrapped if Nato missile modernisation plans are to be shelved.

Herr Schmidt has already stated in public, regardless of Bonn's official acclaim for Mr Reagan's talk of a zero option, that the two sides need to come a little closer.

In his after-dinner speech in Bonn the Chancellor gave an interesting indication of what he may have in mind. He recalled that he had warned the Soviet leaders of the consequences of their missile modernisation since 1978.

Soviet missile modernisation, he had said, was bound to lead to Nato replying in kind, as indeed it has done.

Might this be taken to mean that the number of SS-20s deployed at the beginning of 1978 (less than 100, as against today's 250-odd, each with three warheads) could be considered a reasonable offer by the Soviet Union?

Could a return to this particular status quo be considered sufficient to justify zero missile modernisation by Nato?

This is reported to be the idea at the back of the Chancellor's mind in Bonn today; not only Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr are thinking along these lines.

If this were the case (and there are reasonable arguments in its favour), the exchange of views between Bonn and Washington would need to be greatly intensified.

Helmut Schmidt certainly does not doubt for a moment that when decisions are reached in Geneva he will have played his part.

His talks with the Soviet leaders went well, especially as the Kremlin was caught off balance in its European publicity offensive by President Reagan's decision to push a peace policy on similar terms.

The zero option certainly put the Soviet Union on to the defensive in the media. There was no way in which a revamped moratorium proposal could change this.


Moscow will have to come up with something new in its bid to curry favour with European public opinion, especially with the peace movement.

The propaganda counter-offensive that will probably be launched is that old standby a nuclear-free Europe, the super-zero option, as it were.

In view of the Soviet Union's conventional superiority this alone cannot be enough. But there need be no limit to the imagination of the two sides at Geneva.

Werner A. Perger

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, 29 November 1981)



(Cartoon: Hanel/Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland)

Strauss sounds out opinion in China and Japan

Nordwest-Zeitung

Bavaria's Prime Minister and CSU Chairman Franz Josef Strauss returned from a visit to Tokyo and Peking as the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev began his visit to Bonn.

In all likelihood, the issues Chancellor Schmidt discussed with Brezhnev were also a major topic of Strauss' talks in the Far East: the Soviet threat resulting from the buildup of medium range missiles; the Nato buildup to counter the threat; and concern over the preservation of peace.

The fact that Brezhnev's visit coincided with Strauss's Far East trip could have been pure chance — but it could not have been better timed.

The CSU leader met with great interest in the German view of East-West developments. This gave him the chance to elaborate on the German position.

Even though Strauss and Schmidt occasionally lash out at each other for the benefit of the electorate, they see eye-to-eye on most issues, particularly on the need to boost defences unless negotiation results make this redundant.

Schmidt's talks with Brezhnev and the Strauss' trip to the Far East thus both served national interests.

Strauss is perfectly cast in his role. His acumen in matters of security and international politics is highly regarded or at least respected abroad.

In Tokyo, four English-language newspapers even went so far as to speak of him as the German opposition leader.

In Peking, he was received as *Lao Peng-You* (good old friend).

Deng Xiaoping, deputy chairman of China's Communist Party and the man who actually wields the power, continuously spoke of the fact that Strauss and he had predicted the current developments as far back as 1975. He said that there was no need to review their assessment of Soviet policy.

And now the two politicians are again agreed. As they see it, the 1980s are shaping up as the critical decade of the century. Peace can only be preserved if Europe, China and Japan fully meet [their] security responsibilities. Though [the] Soviet Union is not at present con[tem]plating a war, Moscow's arms build[up is] proceeding at speed to enable the So[viet] Union to win any possible armed co[nflict].

The politicians Strauss talked [to in] Tokyo stressed that Japan's rel[ations] with Peking had never been so go[od in] the past 2,000 years and emphasised [that] this is the best guarantor of stabilit[y in] the Far East.

In Peking, Strauss was told that [ru]mours of a normalisation of Pek[ing-]Moscow ties were totally unfounded.

Soviet-Chinese border disputes w[ould] remain unsettled as long as the So[viet] Union persisted with its policy [of] expansionism, imperialism and hege[mo]nialism.

Peking recommended that the W[est] take a tough stance in bargaining [with] Moscow because only thus could con[ces]sions be wrung from the Soviets.

Strauss hopes that he will have hel[ped] by his trip to bring about no waver[ing] in the attitude towards the Soviets; [he] hope that the West will be tenaciou[s in] the disarmament talks with Mos[cow] while retaining its defence potenti[al]; willingness to remove obstacles to in[ten]sified trade with Europe; and confide[nce] that all this combined will make M[os]cow rethink.

Peter Hope

(Nordwest Zeitung, 25 November 1981)

The German Tribune

Publisher: Friedrich Reinecke. Editor-in-Chief: O[tto] Heinz. Editor: Alexander Anthony. English language sub-editor: Simon Burnett. — Distribution Manager: Georgine Picone.

Friedrich Reinecke Verlag GmbH. 23 Schoene Aussicht, Hamburg 76, Tel.: 22 85 1. Telex: 02-14733.

Advertising rates list No. 13 — Annual subscription DM 35.

Printed by Druck- und Verlagshaus Friedrich Pörtner, Bremen-Blumenthal. Distributed in the USA by: MASS MAILINGS, Inc. 540 West 24th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011.

All articles which THE GERMAN TRIBUNE reprints are published in cooperation with the editorial staffs of leading newspapers of the Federal Republic of Germany. They are complete translations of the original text, in no way abridged nor editorially redrafted.

In all correspondence please quote your subscription number which appears on the wrapper, between asterisks, above your address.

DISARMAMENT

Geneva meeting unfolds chessboard of missile deployment

Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger

[Th]e Geneva disarmament talks on [in]termediate-range missiles are deal[ing wi]th a complicated numbers game.

[The] missile themselves are nuclear [weapo]ns with a considerable destructive [potent]ial, among them the Soviet SS 20 [...] with a range of 4,000km and [three] warheads apiece, making for a [...]ed destruction potential of 150 [...]s of the conventional explosive [...].

[The] American atom bomb that de[stroye]d Hiroshima in 1945, killing [...]0 people, had the explosive power [of 1]5 kilotons of TNT. An SS 20 [...] is thus ten times as destructive as [the H]iroshima bomb.

[The] term "intermediate range weap[ons" i]ndicates that this type of missile [is to b]e differentiated from others to be [...] over either shorter or longer [...]s and this is where the difficulties [...].

[It i]s undisputed that the interconti[nental] ballistic missiles (ICBMS), which [can be] fired at the USA from the Soviet [Unio]n and vice versa, are long-range [weapo]ns. They include the American [Minute]man (range about 8,000km; ex[plosiv]e power 1,000 kilotons) and the [Soviet] SS 18 (range just under 9,000km; [war]heads of 500 kilotons each).

[The] Salt agreement between the two [superp]owers limits the number of these [...] long range weapons. But below [...] there is a grey zone which — [...]ll will — can become a source of [...]s argument: intermediate range [weapo]ns.

[ICB]MS enable one superpower to [...] the other with a destructive [...] in case of an attack on its terri[tory. B]ut the same objective can also be [achiev]ed with intermediate range weap[ons. A]lthough their range is shorter it is [lo]ng enough to permit their use for [strate]gic purposes.

[Sub]marines can take medium range [...]s off the enemy's coast and target [...] on enemy territory.

[The] American Cruise missiles that [Nato] intends deploying in Europe have [a rang]e of more than 3,000km and can [the]refore be launched at strategic targets [west o]f the Urals.

[The] dividing line between long range [weapo]ns (for which at least an attempt [at lim]itation was made) and their me[dium-r]ange counterparts (which are sub[ject t]o no limitation) is unclear.

[Bo]th sides have tried to benefit from [...] interpreting the different catego[ries t]o suit themselves. It is this that [makes] it so difficult to arrive at an [agreem]ent in Geneva.

[...] even, of the two superpowers [were to] agree on definitions there would [still b]e a huge pile of details to be set[tled].

[The]re are, for instance, land-based [mediu]m range missiles; there are those [that c]an be fired from a seaborne plat[form] and there are others that can be [launch]ed from an aircraft.

[The]y also differ concerning the type [of pr]opulsion, range, flying time, accura[cy, ex]plosive power and scores of other [...].

[Asu]ming a comparison of the respective potential is possible at all on the basis of these criteria, experts — if they were given their way — could spend decades trying to figure out whether a balance of power has been established. And according to today's views, such a balance is a must if peace is to be preserved.

The starting positions for the Geneva talks give no indication of these complications. They are brief and to the point, which means that they are one-sided and, for the moment anyway, irreconcilable.

In keeping with President Reagan's offer to negotiate with the Soviet Union, the Americans, speaking for Nato, now demand a reduction of the 250 SS 20 missiles with which the Soviet Union entered the nuclear grey zone in 1975, along with a reduction of older intermediate range missiles that include the SS 4 (340 units) and SS 5 (40).

In return, Washington would waive its deployment as. They were to have been stationed in Europe under the terms of the December 1975 Nato decision in order to counter the threat posed by the Soviet SS 20s.

Brezhnev, on the other hand, during his visit to Bonn proposed a freezing of the current intermediate range missiles on both side. This means that Nato would not be permitted to boost its European defence while the Geneva talks are in progress.

Brezhnev tried to make this old proposal, which the West has repeatedly rejected, more palatable by agreeing to withdraw a "certain part" of Moscow's intermediate range missiles if Washington agrees to the freeze.

The Soviet leader spoke of a reduction "to the tune of hundreds rather than dozens of units in this category."

The positions of the superpowers are irreconcilable because they base their calculations of balance on different premises.

According to Brezhnev, the West has 996 medium range systems in Europe while the East only has 975. But this contention is open to question — if for no other reason because, as far back as 1978, Brezhnev already said that a balance had been achieved and yet Moscow continued its arms buildup unabated.

In the Western view, on the other hand, the Soviets have achieved a dangerous supremacy as a result of their SS 20s. Bonn Government Spokesman Kurt Becker spoke of a ratio of three or four to one.

Neither of the two sides will make concessions without raising demands. It is therefore likely that the Geneva talks will soon range further afield than just the Soviet SS 20s and the American Cruise missiles and Pershing 2s.

The Soviet Union said some time ago that mutual balanced arms reductions must also include the forward-based systems; in other words, above all America's 700 aircraft carrying nuclear devices that are stationed in Western Europe and aboard carriers in the Mediterranean. In addition, Moscow also British and French nuclear weapons as part of the West's intermediate range potential.

Before the West agrees to expand the range of the Geneva talks to include these issues it will probably insist that additional Soviet weapons also be included. These additional weapons could encompass such bombers as the Backfire, Badger and Blinder.

It therefore seems inevitable that the Geneva talks, like other negotiations before them, will bog down in disputes over definitions and details and so obscure the real problem: the dangerous threat which both sides pose to the world by their ceaseless arms buildup.

Hans Werner Kettenbach

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 27 November 1981)

The troop-cut talks march on and on

At half past nine every Thursday morning several dozen pin-striped gentlemen take their places at the conference table in Vienna's Hofburg, the former Austro-Hungarian imperial palace.

One of them reads a speech to the rest, then another session of the MBFR talks on mutual balanced force reduction in Central Europe is over.

Since the talks began in 1973 this time-honoured ritual has taken place 846 times, witnessed beneath the chandeliers by representatives of 12 Nato and seven Warsaw Pact states.

They consist of direct participants, or countries whose troops are stationed in central Europe, and indirect participants, whose territory adjoins the force reduction zone, on the extent of which prior agreement was reached.

The zone comprises the Federal Republic of Germany, the GDR, the Benelux countries, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The aim of the MBFR talks is to reduce troop strength in the region so as to achieve numerical parity of land and air forces.

The current round of talks began in September and will last until Christmas. No-one expects substantial progress, but appearances are deceptive.

All that is needed is pressure on the political trigger for the two sides to go ahead with the first stage of troop cuts in central Europe.

Plans have been negotiated by the various delegations and are ready to be implemented whenever the word is given. Delegates hope it may be given by a conference for which preparations are being made in Madrid.

At the Helsinki review conference in the Spanish capital plans are being drawn up for an all-European conference on confidence-building measures.

The data discussion is the issue that is hampering progress on troop cuts in Vienna. The two pacts have exchanged data on the number of troops they have stationed in the reduction area.

Nato says it has 991,000 men under arms in the countries concerned. The Warsaw Pact claims to have 980,000 troops in its sector of central Europe.

But the West says the Eastern Bloc has 180,000 soldiers and airmen than it will admit to, and delegates have for several years sought in vain to clarify the terms of reference.

Many observers feel this dispute is mere shadow boxing. It is hard to say who is stalling. Nato has certainly called on the Warsaw Pact to be more open on military matters.

The East rejects this demand, claiming that the West merely wants to gain prior access to details of Warsaw Pact organisation.

Since 1979 Nato has submitted a package consisting of eight proposals it would like to see go hand in hand with troop cuts.

They relate to verification and to ensuring that Soviet troops withdrawn from central Europe are not simply transferred to Nato's northern or southern flanks.

But the Warsaw Pact rejects any idea of inspection or observation of military movements at transit points. So progress is now awaited from Madrid, where views seem to be heading towards rapprochement.

The Soviet Union would be willing, at the Madrid talks, to extend confidence-building measures to the Urals provided the West extended its counter-offer to include supply routes across the Atlantic.

Confidence-building measures are, for instance, the exchange of manoeuvre observers and prior notification of troop movements.

At Vienna the two sides are agreed in principle to start sending home US and Soviet forces from central Europe, with the United States being required to withdraw an initial 13,000 and the Soviet Union 30,000 men.

It remains to be seen whether 20,000 Soviet troops and their tanks have left the GDR, as Moscow and East Berlin claim.

In the second stage of troop cuts domestic forces would be reduced to 700,000 soldiers and 200,000 airmen on each side.

Stage Two is due to start three years after the reduction of foreign troops begins, and the Soviet Union has called for a commitment to ensure that troop cuts are continued beyond the first stage.

Nato's proposal is for a reversion provision by which Stage One could be rescinded if no headway were made on Stage Two.

Agreement has been reached on so many other details that agreement on troop ceilings on either side of the East-West border in Europe seems a definite possibility.

Who would stand to benefit more from a troop cut agreement? The answer is, definitely, the West, because the Warsaw Pact would have to reduce some of its current conventional superiority.

The West would be relieved of their fear that the East Bloc armed forces might be in a position to invade and occupy Western Europe from a standing start, as it were.

Soviet troops in any number could only be deployed in neighbouring countries after a breach of the MBFR agreement. This would ensure the West of a much longer early warning.

But the geographical fact of life that US reinforcements would need to be flown 3,000 miles across the Atlantic, whereas Soviet reinforcements would

Continued on page 5

PEOPLE IN POLITICS

Please stand up the real Jürgen Möllemann

Bundestag member Jürgen Möllemann (FDP) is a phenomenon. The man-in-the-street knows the image produced by political public relations rather than the man.

The Möllemann phenomenon is evidenced by the many small and large headlines he makes and the flurry of activities and excitement his name causes in editorial offices.

It is hard to shed the suspicion that the newsmen have succumbed to the effective half-truth of the communications expert Marshall McLuhan to the effect that "the medium is the message."

The medium of politics is publicity — and exactly this, publicity, is Möllemann's most important message.

This being so, the Möllemann phenomenon is the most consistent and almost ingenious development of the traditional understanding of the term "politician" to the limits of absurdity.

There is, of course, also a politician by the name of Möllemann who is vaguely connected with the phenomenon of the same name.

The man Möllemann joined the CDU at the age of 17. In 1970, he turned his back on the Christian Democrats and joined the Free Democrats.

But a couple of weeks ago he once more turned to the CDU when, together with Matthias Wissmann (chairman of the *Junge Union*, the CDU's young members' branch), he called for a demonstration on the eve of Brezhnev's visit to Bonn to protest against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

Was he returning to his political roots? Was he becoming a convert?

As with many others in the coalition, the chairman of the FDP Bundestag Work Group for Foreign, Intra-German and Security Policy has shifted his emphais from détente to security policy. Yet he is anything but an indiscriminate cold warrior. Incidentally, the human rights pathos — which, where the CDU is concerned, grows naturally from the very roots of the conservative party — sounds a bit thin with Möllemann.

Naturally, Mölleman did not act against his genuine convictions when he called for the demonstration and urged his fellow-MPs to sign an Afghanistan resolution.

After all, he also considered it right to charter an aircraft to trail a banner reading "And who is demonstrating in Moscow?" during the 10 October peace rally in Bonn.

But the PR phenomenon Möllemann permits no conclusions regarding the fascinating story of the fighting politician Möllemann — a man of convictions who faces the public after a long struggle within himself. The phenomenon is always bigger than the person and his convictions.

The person, by the way, is by no means unendearing. Nobody in the FDP has ever denied his intelligence and industriousness. And there is no match for him when it comes to campaigning and debating.

It was Möllemann who — almost single-handedly — did away with a white spot on the FDP's political map: defence and security policy.

In fact, he was instrumental in drafting the FDP's parliamentary work programme on security — and there is no narrow-minded militarism in it.

When it comes to internal Bundeswehr matters, Möllemann is both a respected and feared discussion partner who has been rubbing Defence Minister Hans Apel the wrong way, not only through his incisiveness but also through his intimate familiarity with the issues involved.

Whenever Möllemann returns from one of his many visits abroad, it is invariably worthwhile having a chat with him — not only because he is a master in gaining access to interesting and important people but also because he knows how to analyse his experience and has a nose for political developments.

For instance: despite his agreeing with the American security concept in principle, he was quick to discover operational mistakes in the blueprint.

He is certainly not dogmatic, and he frequently shocks orthodox experts by his off the cuff way of voicing ideas. For example: "How about a bit of division of labour for Nato? The nuclear part of the operation for the Americans and the conventional one for the Europeans."

In political debates within the party, he wields a keen blade, mostly defending the positions of FDP right wingers.

His speeches in the Bundestag are well structured, slightly conservative and they usually back the government's view.

Möllemann is a respectable MP of above average standing. But then, there must be about 100 such MPs in the Bonn parliament and none has ever received the same public attention.

There are many reasons for this. Möllemann has an eye for the unorthodox and provocative novelty. He was the first Bonn MP to visit North Korea. He had a two-and-a-half hour private conversation with Cuba's Fidel Castro. (How he arranged it will remain his and Castro's secret.)

He has for years been in touch with PLO leader Arafat, the man most of his fellow-MPs in the West assiduously tried to steer clear of.

Parachutist Möllemann has always enjoyed making his jump over unknown and dangerous territory. And he knows that such a jump is always news worth a headline, regardless whether favourable or unfavourable.

Möllemann is always up front. In the spring of 1978, when the neutron bomb was one of the hottest topics, he had already publicly decided to endorse it while his fellow party members in the Bundestag were still wondering whether to take a stand on this issue at all.

He had publicly backed arms exports to Saudi Arabia long before his party got down to discussing the issue, eventually deciding on delaying tactics — not least because it was upset by Möllemann attempt to make it endorse papers he had already prepared.

For a while Möllemann probably also benefited from the fact that, as his bosom enemy Burkhard Hirsch once put it, he acted as Genscher's ventriloquist.


In any event, the impression was that Möllemann voiced what the party chairman thought but was loath to put into words.

The formula at the Foreign Office now is: we have been informed but Möllemann is travelling on his own initiative and responsibility.

It is pretty safe to assume that Möllemann has at times considered himself Genscher's test pilot and that he hoped to be appointed Minister of State at the Foreign Office.

But the party chairman himself has never publicly acknowledged this role on the part of Möllemann and there is nothing to indicate that Genscher ever wanted to foist him on the Foreign Office.

As to the demonstration on the eve of Brezhnev's visit, here he certainly failed to guess Genscher's secret intentions ... fact, the whole thing was an embar... ment to the Foreign Minister, who ... to receive the Soviet leader as a stat... sitor.



Jürgen Möllemann ... publicity ... message. (Photos: Sven ...)

Whenever newsmen are after a ... vocative statement they know where ... look for it.

Yet it is not so much his statem... that cause the headlines. The notor... secret Middle East plan that was pu... cised after Möllemann's first mee... with Arafat was essentially the pro... of journalistic mistakes and expectati... What happened was that Möllema... image took over.

This is not surprising. Even the ... cient Greek Epictetus knew that "... not facts but views about facts that ... vern our affairs."

Incidentally, this very sentence wa... be found in a letter which a Munich ... vertising agency (in which Mölle... has a stake) circulated among its clie...

It would have been interesting to ... Möllemann about this coincidence, ... this was impossible because he had ... ready left the country to discuss Mid... East affairs with the PLO and Liby... Gaddafi.

Rolf Zundel

(Die Zeit, 20 November 19..)

The indelible Hallstein mark

Walter Hallstein has turned 80. Few people today know that he was one of the most important politicians of Germany's and Europe's post-war history and that he was a lucky dip for the new German state.

It was Chancellor Konrad Adenauer who brought the professor of law to Bonn. He needed an expert on the Schuman Plan for the integration of the coal and steel industries of six European countries which was to mark the beginning of a new European policy.


Hallstein was appointed state secretary at the Chancellery (1950-51) and state secretary at the Foreign Office 1951-1958).

He then became the first president of the European Commission in Brussels (1958-67).

He was instrumental in the difficult task of getting a new country off the ground and integrating the Federal Republic of Germany in the new European and Atlantic order, Hallstein (CDU) was a member of the Bundestag from 1969 to 1972.

Even for his fellow MPs he was something of a historic figure. For his admirers, however, he was above all the "great European".

Hallstein had no shortage of enemies who themselves were men of political stature. The most prominent of them was General de Gaulle. Yet the two respected each other.



Walter Hallstein ... has turned 80.

De Gaulle viewed Hallstein's Europolicy as totally wrong, too legality-bound and not "national" enough.

Hallstein unfolded his views on how European politics should be conducted in a number of great speeches that w... subsequently published in book form.

It is not generally known that the ... ligned Hallstein Doctrine was not ... his brainchild. It was above all fathe... by Professor Grewe.

Hallstein politically upheld this po... as a state secretary.

In essence, the Hallstein Doctrine ... pulated that any diplomatic recogniti... of the GDR by another country wo... be viewed as an unfriendly act towa... the Federal Republic of Germany w... all the consequences this entailed, ... cluding the breaking of diplomatic re... tions.

Hallstein used the doctrine as an ... strument that could be replaced ... another one when it was no longer u... ful.

Surrounded by his art collection, Wa... Hallstein now lives in Stuttgart wh... friends in the neighbourhood care ... him.

No matter what becomes of Europ... politics, Hallstein's mark will remain ... delible.

He will continue to serve as a y... stick for his successors at the Europ... Commission and for European statesm...

He has greatly contributed tow... converting European law into Europ... policy and towards integrating the tw...

Still, much remains to be done.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Ze... für Deutschland, 17 November 1...)

...BOUR

People opt for early retirement as pension schemes hit hard times

"... Early or Work Longer?" were ... options up for discussion at a ... held by the Protestant Church ... in Bad Boll, near Stuttgart.

... mphasis turned out to be very ... early retirement. No-one ... interested in working longer ... ming there was a choice).

... 55 I counted each passing ... participant said, "Five to go, ... two, one, and then the ... When it finally came I first ... bed until nine every morning."

... way she said it, she might have ... ferring to the tail end of a prison ..., not just to her last years at ...

... woman serving a "life sentence" at work said she would appreciate ... ding such heavy demands made ... as her workmates. More leeway ... she wanted.

... would like to be able to say she ... feeling too well and wouldn't be ... ten that morning.

... attending the conference who ... sonally affected by the subject ... such as older workers, older unemployed, disability and old-age pensio... dealt exclusively with early retirement.

... organisers' intention had been to ... open-ended look at pensions ... both with early and with delay... ment.

... people who took part were clearly concerned exclusively with early retirement. "Women can retire at 60," one said, "why not men?"

Other arguments were that the wartime generation was at a disadvantage, having undergone more wear and tear in the course of a hard working life.

And: "I'm too young for a pension but too old to be still working." These were some of the views collected and chalked on the blackboard.

No-one had written: "I would like to work longer."

One reason why this option was neglected what that more than a quarter of the people taking part were older workers who were unemployed and hardly in a position to choose between early retirement and carrying on working.

A 54-year-old man who had worked long years as a furniture packer said: "Now I have a bad back no-one would have me in any case." A former miner who was being retrained as a printer wrote on the board: "What will happen afterwards?" And he didn't mean after retirement.

Retirement was 20 years away as far as he was concerned. What worried him was what was going to happen after he had completed his one-year training course.

People are tending to opt for early retirement in various ways at a time when the pension schemes have run into financial difficulties.

About 70 per cent of men facing the choice opt to retire at 63 rather than 65. Companies are pensioning off 59-year-olds by mutual agreement.

Amd this is happening at a time when the slighest actuarial change costs the pension schemes billions.

Ten thousand wage- or salary-earners who retire at 59 will cost the pension schemes DM420m over a five-year period. Who foots the bill? The community as a whole.

But plans have been drawn up to make those last years at work less arduous and not to face the worker with a choice between all or nothing.

Staggered retirement as practised by the Pieroth company was explained by a spokesman for the management. Staff at 60 can opt to work five hours a week less and forfeit two-and-a-half hours' pay.

Staff at 63 can opt to work 10 hours less a week, of which five will continue to be paid. Pieroth have staggered retirement arrangements for women aged 55 and over.

Cigarette manufacturers have a similar scheme (Pieroth deal in wines). Men from 60 and women from 58 can opt either for retirement on 75 per cent of their full pay or to work a 20-hour week on full pay.

To be entitled to this facility they must have been with the company for at least 15 years (or, in Pieroth's case, 10 years).

At Daimler-Benz, where nine per cent of staff are over 60, early retirement on less pay is an option provided for shift workers.

They can retire at either 61 or 62 provided they have worked at least 10 years om three shifts or 20 years on two.

The Mercedes manufacturers claim that many workers prefer to work longer and retain the company of their workmates than retire early and spend the rest of their lives at home.

But what possibilities of staggered retirement might there be for people who at 52 or 53 are arguably too old to work but too young to retire?

One elderly unemployed man hit the nail on the head when he told the conference the only way he could reach retirement age was via a trough of poverty.

For elderly workers who are unable for health reasons to put in more than 20 hours work a week there is at least a possibility of bridging the gap between unemployment benefit and old-age pension.

The labour exchange assesses benefit entitlement in terms of job availability, whereas the pension scheme assesses early pension applications in terms of health.

But a 1976 ruling of the Federal Welfare Court says that pension awards must take into consideration not only the applicant's health but also the job situation.

In practice, labour exchange records are also consulted by the pension schemes, while people who stand no chance of finding a new job are paid unemployment benefit until they qualify for pensions (or the pension scheme rejects their application).

Frau Dr Kohleiss of the Stuttgart welfare court reminded the conference that rulings must bear in mind that the community as a whole had to foot the bill and that pension schemes were not charities.

At this point an old-age pensioner came up with a striking idea. Must help always be provided by the state or by some institution or other, he asked.

Might not individuals who were earning good money be prepared to sponsor particularly needy unemployed persons?

In his home town he had advertised in the local paper for people to sponsor a woman in distressed circumstances. There had been plenty of offers to pay her telephone bill and help out with other extras.

There should also be more part-time jobs. In Sweden one job in five was a part-time job; in Germany only one in thirteen.

Civil servants, who could not, in any case, be sacked in other than exceptional circumstances (and were thus in a secure position) should be required to contribute in some way towards unemployment insurance.

Old-age pensions should be available for all at 60. Companies that axe jobs by rationalising should be taxed accordingly.

These were some of the ideas put forward by Dr Tegtmeier of the Bonn Labour Ministry. He made it clear that the pension schemes have little leeway, since pensions had to be paid from contributions.

But with a little more imagination and readiness to rethink, labour and incomes could be redistributed in a more humane manner.

Isolde Neidlein

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 20 November 1981)

Troop-cut talks

Continued from page 3

need only to march a few hundred miles, cannot be refuted.

Mutual balanced force reduction was, appropriately, a Western idea, prompted by the June 1968 Nato conference in Reykjavik.

The West later made its agreement to the holding of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe subject to the East agreeing to hold the Vienna MBFR talks.

The only clear interest the Soviet Union had in the Vienna talks was the possibility it might bring of manpower cuts in the Bundeswehr.

Moscow has not forgotten this objective, but it has declined in importance now the Soviet Union has agreed on both sides being entitled to reduce their troop strengths collectively.

This means that countries are not required to reduce manpower by equal percentages, so the pressure on Bonn is no longer as intense as it used to be.

The Soviet Union has scaled down what used to be its main demand to a requirement that no one country is to be entitled to account for more than 50 per cent of its side's collective troop strength in Central Europe.

Since Bundeswehr manpower in the region at 445,000 is a whisker less than 50 per cent of the collective Nato total of 900,000, the West already meets this requirement.

Yet Nato has no current intention of agreeing to it. It fails to see why Moscow should be entitled to a say in how the West runs its military affairs.

Pierre Simonitsch

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 9 November 1981)

■ TRADE

Huge gas for pipes deal settled

The "contract of the century" between Soyuz-Gasexport, Moscow, and Ruhrgas AG, Essen, has been finalised: contract of the century because it extends beyond the 20th century and because of the amount of money involved.

Even at today's prices, the contract involving the annual supply to Western Europe of 50bn cubic metres of Soviet natural gas during the whole duration of the deal amounts to almost DM400bn.

This marks a new dimension in the international energy business.

Unlike the three previous gas contracts between Ruhrgas and the Soviet Union, this deal, which took years to negotiate, has caused considerable political controversy.

Its main opponent was President Reagan. He was backed by a number of German Opposition politicians for whom every deal with Moscow amounts to a pact with the devil.

They say this contract will increase the Kremlin's political influence and that, by doubling its share of gas supplies to Germany, Moscow could exert pressure.

In addition, the huge foreign exchange earnings from the mid 1980s would strengthen not only the economic but also the military potential of the Soviet Union.

It is, however, rather curious that these reservations voiced at the Ottawa Summit in July were directed only at Chancellor Schmidt.

Although Ruhrgas is the principal contractor, the contract involves six other countries, France, Belgium, Holland, Austria, Italy and Switzerland.

The 5,000km pipeline that is still to be built and that will link Western Siberia with Europe will pump three-quarters of the gas flowing through it to these other countries leaving Germany with 10.5bn cubic metres, a bit more than a quarter.

Assuming that the Soviets really intend to turn off the tap at some point, they would risk a confrontation with half of Europe.

Those who argue that the gas could be used as a political and economic lever with which to exert pressure completely overlook the Soviet Union's interests.

For one thing, Moscow must itself invest billions of deutschemarks to open up the huge gas deposits in Western Siberia, to lay the pipeline and to develop its own gas grid.

For another, all the money spent on this, much of which will go to German industrial companies, can only result in a profit if the gas actually reaches the European homes. It's a case of no gas, no money.

A brief look at our sources of energy shows that the danger of becoming dependent on the Soviet Union and thus vulnerable to blackmail is minimal.

About two-thirds of the primary energy used in this country has to be imported — and this is unlikely to change in the future.

As a result, Germany cannot achieve absolute supply safety and will always depend on imports. All this country can do is improve the degree of relative security. And this means diversification both in type and source of energy.

Gas is the third most important energy source and now accounts for 16 per cent, of which Moscow currently provides one-sixth.

And even when, as a result of the new contract, Moscow's supplies 30 per cent, this will still be less than six per cent of total energy needs.

Our dependence on Libyan oil is much greater.

In addition, forgoing this mammoth contract would have set back Bonn's policy of getting away from oil.

Jürgen Klotz

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 21 November 1981)

GAS FOR WESTERN EUROPE

Yamal, Urengoy, Vuktyl, Medvezhe, Punga, Gubinskoye, Leningrad, Tchumen, Moscow, Orenburg, Tchebelinka, Kiev, Jefremov, Rostov, Essen, Prague, Brussels, Paris, Munich, Vienna, Lyons, Berne, Milan, Gazli, Achak, Tchatlyk

1980

Contract goes through despite fears

KielerNachrichte[n]

Years of making German[y] dependent on the Soviet Union [...] been rekindled by the gas-for-pipe[s ...] that will pump an additional [...] cubic metres of Soviet gas into [...] country every year.

Up to now, the Soviet Union's [...] in Germany's energy requirements [...] only three per cent (18 per cent o[f ...] needs). But both will rise consid[erably] once the gas begins to flow.

Ruhrgas AG, Essen, the princip[al ...] the contract on the German side, [...] fident that even should the [...] Union turn off the tap at some [...] Germany's gas supplies would not [...] unduly.

Ruhrgas says the deal will [...] dependence on Opec oil without m[...] Soviet gas vital for the nation's e[...] requirements.

It will also reduce the oil bill b[...] on the balance of payments.

Germany's current energy require[ments] essentially rest on three pillars: oil[...] and gas. A fourth comprising n[...] energy, hydroelectric power and [...] forms of energy is still being devel[oped].

Close to half of the primary e[...] used in 1980 (47.6 per cent) wa[s ac]counted for by oil; not quite one [...] (29.8 per cent) by coal; and one [...] (16.3 per cent) by gas.

Nuclear energy accounted for on[ly ...] per cent and all other forms of e[...] combined for 2.6 per cent.

Some 83 per cent of our gas req[uire]ments came from Western Europ[e ...] per cent from domestic sources, 3[...] cent from Holland and 16 per cent [...] Norway. The rest was supplied by [...] Soviet Union.

Germany's gas business now wan[ts ...] increase the share of this fuel to [...] tween 18 and 20 per cent in the [...] term. This would mean that gas [...] sumption here would coincide with [...] world average of 19 per cent.

Most of the additional gas is t[...] supplied by the Soviet Union, sta[rting] from 1984/85 (12bn cubic metre[s ...] year). This would increase the S[...] quota from the present 18 to 30 [...] cent by the late 1980s.

The gas, from western Siberia, [...] Southern Urals, the Ukraine a[...] region near Orensburg, will be pip[ed ...] Europe through the East-West pi[...] and the European gas grid.

Destination countries are France, [...] tria and Italy, Holland, Belgium [...] Switzerland, along with Germany.

Starting from 1985/86, an addi[tional] 2bn cubic metres is to flow to Ge[rmany] from Norway's sector of the North S[ea].

Nigeria, which is now burning [...] gas than Germany produces, is to [...] 8bn a year cubic metres of liquefie[d ...] by tanker to western Europe s[...] from 1990. Some of it will find i[ts ...] to Germany.

Other sources, North and South [Ame]rica, Africa and the Middle East, [...] pected to supply additional gas, [...] before the 1990s.

(Kieler Nachrichten, 21 Novemb[er ...])

German-Soviet trade has always had the same handicap: the Soviet Union cannot supply what the Germans need and cannot pay for the German goods it needs.

Basic problems in commerce with Soviets


Trade between the two began rising steadily in the 1950s but remained negligible in relation to Germany's foreign trade volume.

In the mid 1960s, Germany's imports from the Soviet Union amounted to about DM1bn. Exports did not exceed the DM1bn mark until three years later. The Soviet Union's share in this country's overall foreign trade thus remained below one per cent.

It was not until the era of détente that the concept of limited cooperation that had governed German-Soviet trade relations since 1950 was abandoned in favour of normal economic relations in terms of international law; and it was then that German exports to the USSR started growing.

A network of treaties and agreements in the 1970s and the liberalisation of trade relations in their wake made it easier for the Soviet Union to export to this country.

By the same token, German companies, benefiting from the government's promotion and guarantees, were able to develop their business with Moscow.



The preconditions for a boom in trade were thus created. Exports rose by an annual average of more than DM1bn to DM6.9bn between 1970 and 1975, increasing the Soviet Union's share of German exports to three per cent.

But this growth was one-sided. During the same period, the Soviet deficit with the Federal Republic of Germany rose by an average of DM1.5bn a year although the terms of trade shifted in favour of the Soviet Union due to the energy price increases.

To offset this, the Soviets put curbs on German imports, which stagnated until 1980.

The euphoria that marked German-Soviet trade relations in the early 1970s has given way to the realisation that trade between the two does not depend on goodwill alone.

The difficulties are fundamental. The Soviet Union's investment policy (like those of all other countries with centrally controlled economies) largely disregards froeign trade requirements. Central planning calls for the standardisation of products, which makes them unsuitable for Western markets.

Russia would like to sell machinery

Continued on page 7

[IN]DUSTRY

[T]he march of the robots on to the factory floor

[...]he Allgemeine

[...] of robots do the welding [...] Volkswagen assembly line in [...]

[...]ree years ago, welders stood [...] to shoulder doing the same [...] there are only a few men. [...] at consoles surrounded by [...]ights.

[...] 1,800 robots toil in German [...] and within the next four years [...] expected to be twice as many. [...] are more robots working in [Ger]many than in Europe's other [im]portant industrial countries put [...] Most of them are in industrial [...] processes.

[...] has already outstripped America [...] both America and Europe lag [...] Japan. The Japanese were quick[er to] draw and much more consist[ent in ma]king use of the advantages of [...]al labour.

[...] is trying to develop its highly [...] production processes still fur[ther ...] robots are being produced in large [...], mostly not for sale but for the [...] own use.

["G]host shift" is far from a futu[re sci]ence-fiction vision in Japan. [...] is the term used for produc[tion pro]cesses in which robots have [...]er completely, where there are [...] in sight except at control [...]

[...] development is irreversible. Ac[cording] to American forecasts, which [...] are conservative, the begin[ning of] the next decade will see some [...] robots world-wide producing a [...] of goods.

[...] assembly line workers in Ger[many ...] not consider robots a major [...]

[...] not yet particularly worried [...]," says Hans Jäger of the Metalworkers Union. But this [...] soon.

[...] does worry Jäger and other [...] is the next generation of in[...] robots. And it is exactly this se[cond gen]eration that management plans [...] on.

[Compa]red with tomorrow's robots, [...] today seem like illiterates.

[...] is that today's robots are as [...] and dependable as they are [...] they can only carry out the tasks [...] their masters have programm[ed].

[...] they do with a perfection no [...] being can match. They do not [...] doing the same thing day in and [...] and as long as their technical [...] free from ailments, as long as [...] blood — electricity — keeps [...] they don't ask for a break.

[...] would be wrong to assume [...] like workers, they are never [...] from the job. Breakdowns were [...] in the early days some ten [...]. And this still happens when [...] assembly line abruptly switches [...] to mechanical labour.

[...] breakdowns and their inade[quate in]tegration into the production [...] were the main reasons for the [...] reticence of American industry [...]

America developed and used its first industrial robots in the late 1960s.

One of the leaders was the world's biggest auto maker, General Motors; and GM's scepticism still has its effect on its German subsidiary, the Adam Opel AG, which wants to proceed cautiously in changing.

But the Japanese, always quick to seize on any kind of technical innovation, imported some of the early American robots at the beginning of the 1970s.

Daimler-Benz and VW also made a point of evaluating the American robots but, in the end, they decided that they were not what they needed.

VW was already highly automated when it still produced the Beetle. But the assembly lines on which a daily 4,200 Beetles were welded together had one major drawback: all they could produce was Beetles.

The moment a new model went into production it took tedious and extremely costly modifications to adjust to the new line.

And the days when an auto maker could make out splendidly on one good model are long over. Today, any automobile maker must be capable of instant adjustment to changing whims of buyers if he is to hold his own against the competition.

The present generation of robots plays a major role here. Like humans they always handle one particular tool, such as a welding machine or a spraygun.

Their steel limbs can be moved much in the same way man moves his. The robot's scope of movement ranges between three and seven different motions.

This is rather primitive considering the fact that man can carry out 32 different arm motions. "It's very difficult to imitate nature," says VW engineer Folker Weissgerber, who is responsible for production planning.

The data bank tells the robot what movement to make when. In the case of the Renault 9 the robots weld 4,200 points in every car body. The big Mercedes of the S class needs 6,000 welds.

Yet these robots can work on different models moving along the same assembly line, even if they follow each other in a totally chaotic sequence.

They're not bothered about a tea break . . . robots putting a Mercedes together.
(Photo: Henning Christoph)

A VW bus can thus be welded immediately after a van or a pickup truck. The data bank tells the robot at the assembly line which part is meant for which vehicle and where the welds are to be made.

But it could well impose an entirely unexpected psychological strain on the human worker if he were to consider himself demoted to a robot's helper, carrying out a few remaining tasks that are too complicated for his mechanical counterpart. This is one of the findings of a study for the Metalworkers Union by a team of Göttingen sociologists.

As VW's Weissgerber sees it: "The workers feel that the robots have detracted from their own position. But the use of robots must also be seen in another light. Mechanisation can also be humanisation."

The head of production at Renault, Bihanic, says it makes no sense to use robots at random. Instead, they must be fully integrated in the production process.

It is not enough to buy a robot and his programme. Before putting a mechanical man to work, his entire production environment must be thoroughly analysed so that the robot can become an integral part of the work process.

This was one of the reasons why VW decided at an early stage to develop and make its own robots. Renault followed suit and founded a subsidiary for the manufacture of robots.

VW produces about a dozen robots a week. But no special subsidiary has been established for this purpose, probably because VW's robots are for the company's own use.

Weissgerber: "We'll be kept busy making robots for ourselves for at least another two-and-a-half years."

In the Federal Republic of Germany, VW and Keller & Knappich vie with each other for first place in the manufacture of robots (Keller & Knappich is part on the Quant Group).

Japan has some 40 firms making robots. Kawasaki Heavy Industries is the leader. Among other top manufacturers are Asea in Sweden and Unimation in Cincinnati, USA.

All are working on the next, more intelligent generation of robots.

The American idea is to give them two arms instead of one, which would greatly enlarge the scope of action.

VW wants its robots to be able to see, feel and hear. They are being equipped with sensors and TV cameras so they can pick and install the right part out of a box containing different components.

Others robots are to do not only point welding but also weld seams in exactly the right place.

This work is still being done by men at Volkswagen's Hanover plant. But it will only take a year before the sensor robots replace some.

Hans Jäger of the Metalworkers Union fears that the new generation of sensor robots could lead to large-scale redundancies.

It is an accepted rule of thumb that one robot can replace two to three workers. The cost depends on the type of robot, but averages between DM100,000 and DM400,000. This price can be reduced by using more microprocessors.

One man can maintain about a dozen robots. Besides, robots are dependable and have a long life expectancy. Breakdowns in routine work amount to less than one per cent of the working time, says Weissgerber.

But even so, he cannot visualise ghost factories operating with ghost shifts.

Not least due to the wary attitude by the trade unions, VW's production planner considers a 60 per cent quota of robots in one production process as realistic.

This will become reality in a few years and in a growing number of branches of industry.

Union apprehension for the future is not unfounded. Up to now, workers made redundant by robots have been given other jobs within the company, 300 in Hanover.

But finding alternative work will become increasingly difficult.

Dieter Tasch

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 21 November 1981)

Continued page 6

on a large scale but German quality standards are too high.

There is little general industrialisation because the Soviet Union's industrial growth, due to the system, goes for bulk production rather than quality.

This is why Moscow wants mammoth programmes and orders, and this in turn makes it difficult for small German companies to benefit from the trade.

The composition of its trading goods shows how limited the Soviet Union's export potential is — and it is on this that the further development of German trade depends.

Though official figures for 1980 show that 65.5 per cent of Soviet exports to Germany consisted of semi-finished products and 22.7 per cent of raw materials, the dominant element in these semi-finished products were oil-based goods.

Finished products accounted for only 9 per cent of Soviet exports compared with 86.8 per cent in Germany's exports to the Soviet Union.


The Soviet Union therefore tries to make as many barter deals as possible in a bid to improve its export chances.

But this violates the concept of a free economy to the effect that the flow of goods must be governed by prices resulting from supply and demand rather than by contractual deals.

So it is impossible to see right now how the Soviet share in Germany's foreign trade can be increased beyond the present 2.2 per cent.

Gottfried Eggerbauer

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 20 November 1981)



■ PERSPECTIVES

Moscow's plight: it has nothing the world either wants or needs

Early this year State Secretary Amaya of the Japanese Economic Affairs Ministry said in a published interview that he felt the 80s would mark the beginning of the end of Soviet power.

This is a view Mr Brezhnev may well share. There are good reasons why he might do so.

Even the most level-headed appraisal is sure to conclude that Mr Brezhnev heads an empire the change or even disintegration of which would be welcomed by many and regretted by few.

One almost feels sorry for the Soviet leader. It seems reasonable to assume that the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Bulgarians and Germans in the GDR would not shed a tear if Soviet rule were to end.

In the Third World the decline and fall of the last late colonial empire would be viewed with equanimity, especially as apart from words and weapons it had little more to offer than variations on the theme of dependence.

The gigantic Soviet empire with its potential for unlimited opportunity has failed to find a solution to its continual economic hardships.

Despite heavy debts Moscow has run up in the free world Russia has been unable to make a breakthrough and is unlikely ever to do so.

The Soviet Union is playing no part in the powerful, future-orientated upswing of regions in various parts of the world, especially the Pacific, but also North and South America and Africa.

It is steadily falling back. Having ill-advisedly triggered an arms race, Moscow will find itself increasingly short of breath. This is another race it cannot win once the free world seriously joins in the race, however reluctantly and laboriously.

The Soviet Union is undeniably a great power, but it lacks a foreign policy concept appropriate to this day and age. It no longer has anything to offer the world that the world either wants or needs.

So it is hardly surprising that Moscow gives rise to more fear than hope. The Soviet Union is already being overtaken and outstripped by the major currents of the age.

The main reason why this is the case is probably that a policy of imperialism has grown antediluvian and that the Soviet leaders have not yet summoned the intellectual courage to pursue policies that might make dealings with them more interesting or promising.

A power that behaves as the Soviet Union does, formulating and enforcing such a disgraceful policy as the Brezhnev Doctrine, disregarding the sovereignty of states even beyond the bounds claimed for the Brezhnev Doctrine, practising overt and subversive intervention, refusing the right of self-determination and continually violating human rights, cannot be surprised when its words, which stand in stark contrast to its deeds, no longer carry conviction with anyone who might prove a valuable partner.

Those who fall foul of these blandishments will in the long run merit no more than contempt by virtue of their intellectual or moral weakness.

That is what makes them worthless, indeed dangerous, for Moscow. The Kremlin would do well to stop speculating on our momentary madness.

In Germany no-one who has been responsible for the policy of detente will be able to forget the sad lesson that the Soviet Union embarked on an enormous arms build-up at a time when they were hoping to reap the fruits of detente.

To add insult to injury, Bonn made it easier for Moscow to rearm by offering Moscow generous economic cooperation, including the loans to underwrite it.

Despite well-nigh morbid talk of Soviet intentions and capabilities, the main aim of which seems to be to make us first worried, then pliable, there is something the Soviet Union would be well-advised to bear in mind.

It is that the world as a whole would not be prepared to accept a further accretion of faits accomplis in breach of all standards that govern international law and that a major clash would be bound to end with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

It is easy enough to understand Mr Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders of his generation. One can even feel the same way they must do when they try to defend the result of the Second World War for as long as humanly possible.

The price of victory in World War II was, for the Soviet Union, 20 million dead. But in power politics there is no such thing as for ever.

If the Soviet Union had only exercised moderation in its claims and implemented them by methods other than those of despotism, the impossibility of its grand design would not have been so swiftly or dramatically apparent.

As matters stand, however, the entire enterprise stands no chance whatever.

Policies must be reviewed, concepts reappraised and methods reconsidered if there is to be any change in the direction of stable conditions and lasting cooperation.

A realisation that history must take its course and a sense of the course it is taking could help the Soviet leaders to find a way out of the problems they face.

The signs are that change is in the offing. Those who would have the Soviet leaders reassured in their mistaken belief that the old approach might once more succeed have only themselves to blame for endangering peace.

Even those who would like to strike a balance on the strength of current circumstances are talking about the past, not the present. Poland is no more than a pointer to the shape of things to come.

As yet the signs being exchanged between Europe, America and the remainder of the non-Communist world are confused and unclear. But the right questions are already being asked on all sides.

The mist is clearing and the outlines of a new view of world affairs are [...] shape.

Discussion of Soviet affairs see[ms to] go round in circles and is both ti[...] and of strictly limited interest [...] overwhelming majority of countries.

They have set their sights o[n the] future and feel they face major, w[...] tasks that call for solutions other [than] imperialist power politics.

We and our friends in the free [world] can supply the answers now; the [Soviet] Union cannot do so yet.

We in the Federal Republic o[f Ger]many have neither the power n[or the] size to play any special part w[ithout] running risks of one kind or anoth[er].

It is the Soviet Union that ou[ght to] start wondering how to get roun[d the] present impasse and to evolve a f[...] policy worthy of a world power.

It would need to be a policy sub[stitut]ing for despotism freely chosen co[opera]tion welcomed by all concerned.

Since it would be presumptuo[us to] offer the Kremlin unsolicited adv[ice, it] might well be best to leave it ti[...] reconsider and to wait and see.

The Soviet Union could have G[erma]ny as a friend and a partner (and [not] only Germany), but not on the bas[is of] its present policies.

Time is on our side and unless [all] indications are deceptive the Soviet [lea]ders have no time to lose if they [are to] belie the gloomy forecasts of wha[t lies] ahead for them in Asia and ensure [the] good of their peoples.

Günther Di[ehl]

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und [Welt], 20 November [1981])

Günther Diehl was the Bonn g[overn]ment's press spokesman under Chan[cellor] Kurt Georg Kiesinger and last serv[ed as] ambassador in Tokyo.

Ethnic German question won't go away

Ethnic Germans were busy in the Soviet Union again before Mr Brezhnev visited Bonn, demonstrating in Moscow to draw attention to their applications to rejoin families or simply to emigrate to the Federal Republic of Germany.

Days before he flew to Bonn eight Soviet Germans staged a protest on Red Square. They were promptly arrested and returned to their homes in the Caucasus.

There, in the Karbadino-Balkaric Autonomous Republic, at least the initiators of such protest bids can expect to be prosecuted if the authorities feel a court case is called for.

By all accounts the law as administered in this particular pocket republic, which recently celebrated with pomp and circumstance its sixtieth anniversary, is profoundly provincial.

Repatriation of ethnic Germans from Russia has always been a feature of talks between Bonn and Moscow, but seldom have the prospects looked as poor as at present.

Since 1970 nearly 65,000 ethnic Germans, people whose forebears have lived in Russia for generations, have been granted exit permits to start a new life in the West.

Their number increased markedly once the 1970 Bonn-Moscow treaty came into force. That year only 438 Soviet Germans arrived in the Federal Republic; two years later 3,315 came.

The number peaked in 1976 at 9,626, since when it has steadily declined. Last year only 5,653 ethnic Germans joined relatives in the Federal Republic.

This year the decline has been even more drastic. By the end of October 3,164 arrivals were registered, followed in the first three weeks of November by a mere 40.

Views differ on the total number of would-be emigres. Some say they number 10 per cent of the 1.8m-plus Soviet Germans. About 80,000 applications have been registered by the Red Cross; another 20,000 or so are known to want to leave the Soviet Union.

The desire to return to Germany, a country they have never seen, is particularly marked in areas to which Volga Germans were deported at the beginning of the Second World War.

In their new homes in the Far East and North of the Soviet Union, ethnic Germans may, for the most part, be highly rated as hard workers, but they form only small minorities among the local nationalities.

They feel their linguistic and cultural identity is threatened. Most of their children have no longer learnt German, the South German dialect of the Volga Germans; their native language is Russian.

The desire to emigrate is limited only in areas where, as in the Altai region, between eastern Kazakhstan and southwest Siberia, German communities have stayed together for generations.

The Soviet authorities say the decline in numbers of ethnic German emigres over the past few years is because the original demand has gradually been met.

In practice the opposite would seem to be the case. Many new arrivals lead to a snowball of further applications for families to be reunited.

In reality the frustrated emigr[ants are] for the most part victims of worl[d af]fairs. In the early days of detente [the] Soviet authorities suddenly eased re[stric]tions.

The thaw having been followe[d in] recent years by a gradual chill, they [have] steadily reverted to more restrictive p[rac]tices.

The connection is corroborated by [the] almost total standstill of Jewish emi[gra]tion, which has always allowed in[fer]ences to be drawn on the state of [So]viet-US ties.

This harder line is gradually ta[king] shape in other sectors of Soviet do[mes]tic policy.

Last summer even Willy Brand[t, a] man held in high repute by the K[rem]lin, was no longer able to persuade [the] Soviet authorities to be obliging [in a] number of cases of hardship.

Mr Brezhnev seemed as willin[g as] ever to help, but Herr Brandt mad[e no] headway. The people who now hav[e the] last word on such cases, or so it [would] seem, feel the time is not ripe for [for]eign policy gestures or presents for [visit]ing statesmen.

They either feel compliments sh[ould] be returned in kind or are genera[lly of] the opinion that foreign policy con[sul]tations are best dealt with by a to[...] domestic outlook.

So a far-reaching improvement in [the] situation can only be hoped to [come] from a change in the overall clima[te of] world affairs.

It was certainly not to be expect[ed to] occur in the wake of protestatio[ns of] good intentions by Mr Brezhnev and [...] Schmidt in Bonn.

Uwe Engelbr[echt]

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 21 Novemb[er 1981])

SPACE RESEARCH

Unlocking the secrets of number R 136a

[Fra]nkfurter Rundschau

[R] 136a is a sun in the Doradus ne[bu]la, part of the Magellanic Cloud, [...]y near our own, and its mass is [...] 2,000 times greater than that of [...]n Sun.

[Th]is has been confirmed by satellite [obser]vation via the International Ultra[violet] Explorer satellite.

[Th]e Sun has long been known to be [noth]ing special in terms of the wide [range] of astrophysical possibilities. In [its] surface temperature and the light [it em]its the Sun is very much a run-of-[the-m]ill star.

[The]re are much brighter, hotter stars [with] much more mass to show for them[selves]. But theoreticians specialising in [how] stars are formed say there must be a [limit] to the size even of superstars, [espec]ially their mass.

[The] view generally held until recently [was] that in neighbouring galaxies there [were] unlikely to be stars with more than [...]es the mass of our own Sun.

[In] exceptional cases there might be [st]ars out that were 100 times larger, [but] they would definitely be the excep[tion].

[The] explanation is that most stars are [on]es with a mass a few times greater [than] the Sun's. Very few are much smal[ler, le]t alone substantially larger.

[Bes]ides, stars with a high mass count [use] up their nuclear fuel much faster [than] others, so they tend to be extreme[ly sh]ort-lived.

[The]y not only come into being less [ofte]n, they also die faster. So well estab[lish]ed is this assumption that the idea [of a] stellar object 2,000 or more times [the] Sun's size is both surprising and [contro]versial among astronomers.

[The] discovery is the result of a tho[rough] probe of the 30 Doradus gas ne[bula], also known as the Tarantula Ne[bula], in the Magellanic Cloud.

[Th]e nebula is an extensive area of [ionis]ed hydrogen, and the ionisation [must] be the work of high-intensity ra[diati]on from within the nebula.

[Fro]m the radiation emitted by the [nebul]a it must be assumed that it con[tains] an energy source about 100 times [more] powerful than that of the hottest [stars], those in the spectral class O.

[Th]e search for the source of this ra[diati]on hit some time ago on an unusual [objec]t in the centre of the nebula, an [objec]t that was named R 136a.

[Op]tical investigation led German as[trono]mers such as Johannes Feitzinger, [Geb]hart Schlosser, Theodor Schmidt-[Kale]r and Christoph Winkler of the as[trono]my department at Bochum Univer[sity] to conclude that R 136a must be a [star] with an enormous mass.

[I]t alone was felt to account for the [amoun]t of ionised radiation produced by [the] Doradus nebula.

[B]ut the Bochum astronomers were [un]able in their article for *Astronomy [and] Astrophysics* to provide any clear [...]ter to the mass of this stellar object.

[N]ew facts have been brought to light [by] the high-resolving spectral observa[tions] undertaken by the International Ul[tra]violet Explorer satellite.

[The]y are outlined by three Wisconsin University astrophysicists in *Science* and provide extremely interesting information on previously unknown properties of R 136a.

They base on spectral analysis the conclusion that the temperature on the surface of R 136a is a hitherto unsurpassed 63,000 degrees Kelvin, or roughly 63,273 centigrade.

The surface temperature of our Sun is a mere 6,000 degrees Kelvin.

In connection with the visual brightness observed by the Bochum astronomers, R 136a must be 100 million times brighter than the Sun.

It is hardly surprising that this star accounts for virtually all the light emitted by the entire nebula.

Other properties have been identified from analysis of the profile of a number of absorption lines in the star's spectrum that are caused by ionised carbon, nitrogen and helium.

They clearly indicate the existence of extremely powerful stellar winds. The outer shell of R 136a's matter is blown into the surroundings at speeds of up to 3,500 kilometres per second.

As a result the object loses mass at a rate corresponding to the mass of an entire Sun every 1,000 years.

Such intensive stellar winds are only known to exist on the surface of extremely hot stars in the 03 category. But stars in this category reach only 52,000 degrees Kelvin, or much less than R 136a.

Besides, at least 30 to 40 of them would need to be assembled in a small area if they were to account for the overall brilliance of R 136a.

So the only acceptable explanation is that R 136a is a single stellar object with extremely marked properties.

One must then assume that on its surface acceleration of gravity and radiation pressure cancel each other out.

It would follow that R 136a has a mass 2,000 times that of the Sun. Experts on the origin of heavenly bodies will have difficulty in accounting for its existence.

Hans-Jörg Fahr

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 21 November 1981)

An eye on the sky

This computerised 3.6 metre telescope is one of 10 at the European Southern Observatory site at La Silla in Chile. Work at the observatory is processed at an electronic centre in Munich. (Photo: ESO)



Preparing for the lift off

Ulf Merbold (left), German candidate for one of the astronaut places in the European spacelab to be launched in 1983, goes through his paces in a simulator at Mainz University. His colleagues are Americans. (Photo: dpa)

European scientists plan probe to Mars

The European Space Agency plans to send a space probe to Mars, possibly in 1988 or 1990.

A feasibility study to examine technical problems has been commissioned. It will be carried out by Belgian, French, British, Italian and German scientists headed by Professor Ulf von Zahn of Bonn University.

In 1978, Professor von Zahn became the first non-American to contribute an experiment to an American interplanetary mission.

His device for probing the chemical make-up of the upper atmosphere of Venus supplies findings that were regarded as sensational.

They certainly did not tally with previous theories on the origin of the solar system and were typical of the problems Venus presents in connection with the history of the solar system.

The upper atmosphere of Venus was found to contain an unexpectedly high count of Argon 36, a rare gas that is known to be primordial and to date back to the early days of the solar system. Its relative concentration in the atmosphere of Venus is markedly higher than in our own. Yet its frequency had been felt to depend largely on temperature. Closer to the Sun (as Venus is in relation to Earth) less gas, or so it was felt, was likely to collect from the initial cloud of gas and dust that gave birth to a planet. So Venus ought to have less of this gas in its atmosphere than either Earth or, still further away from the Sun, Mars. The Pioneer mission to Venus would, it was hoped, help scientists to sort out the wheat from the chaff among theories on the origin of the solar system.

But the readings taken by Professor von Zahn's device indicated that the truth was altogether different from current assumptions.

Von Zahn himself would not like too much importance to be attached to the findings. They might just be a red piece in a jigsaw puzzle that was mainly blue-green in colour. They need not rule out all previous theories.

There would not be any clear indication of a need to rewrite the early history of the solar system until more red pieces were found.

Besides, there were already various competing versions as to the origins of the planetary system of which we formed a part.

A conference on Venus research held in Palo Alto, near San Francisco, has shed more light on the subject.

US experiments on board the Venus probe showed crypton and xenon counts were likewise higher than in the Earth's atmosphere.

Dr Thomas Donahue of the University of Michigan said the ratio of these three gases on Venus had much more in common with the ratio in the Sun's atmosphere than it did with their relative concentration in the Earth's atmosphere.

Mannheimer MORGEN

He infers that they were blown across from the Sun in an early stage of development when solar wind was at times much stronger than it is today.

More found its way into the early atmosphere of Venus than into that of Earth, which was further away from the Sun.

This inference has been borne out by measurements in the Martian atmosphere, which contains an even lower count of these three rare gases than does our own.

Planetary research scientists are more and more convinced Mars will hold the

Continued on page 10

■ THE ENVIRONMENT

Men from the Ministry take closer look at health hazards in the disco

Regulations issued by the Lower Saxon Welfare Ministry in Hanover take a closer look at environmental aspects of the decibels and light effects generated in discotheques.

Health hazards are the problem, not just the noise that keeps neighbours awake. Licensing authorities have been told to be stricter in enforcing environmental protection regulations for disco equipment.

The Ministry regulations quote a wide range of relevant legislation and refer to the health hazards to visitors and staff and the nuisance neighbours suffer.

The chief offenders are said to be outsize combinations of amplifier and loudspeaker and inadequate noise insulation.

Laser light effects are also rated problematic: "The main risk is that of permanent damage to the eyesight of customers and staff."

The men from the Ministry have no intention of spoiling anyone's fun; they just want to enforce enviromental, labour protection and planning regulations at the disco.

Citing technical, mathematical and physical standards and guidelines, they conclude that in discotheques and bars where music is played the noise should not as a rule exceed 90 decibels.

There are various kinds of decibels from which to choose, but the one that is relevant in this context is the dB (A), or perceived noise decibel.

The Hanover regulations say music ought not to exceed 85 and must not exceed 90 perceived noise decibels. This noise level is described by the Bundesbahn in Minden as equivalent to the noise in a noisy factory workshop.

The experts have yet to agree on noise levels, but doctors are in no doubt that from specific levels on, noise makes you ill.

In hotels and catering establishments, dance halls and discotheques regulations must now be strictly observed and before they are opened the go-ahead must be given by various authorities.

They range from the factory inspectorate to the accident insurance scheme, and where noise is concerned the requirements seem fairly straightforward even though opinions may differ on what is noisy and what is quiet.

The regulations governing laser light effects are even stricter.

Amplifiers will have to be fitted with noise regulators, tested for accuracy at regular intervals, that ensure specified decibel counts are not exceeded.

Noisy establishments will have to be insulated and have structural alterations made to them, not to mention staff being required to ensure that not too much noise is made outside.

A discö that fails to comply with these requirements will run the risk of having its operating licence rescinded.

As for lasers, the Ministry says they como in five categories ranging from harmless to the human eye to dangerous for sight, skin and a fire hazard.

Staff are exposed to the risks of lasers and flashing lights even more than customers; they are seldom able to get a moment's respite.

So extra provisions have been made for staff. They include a twice-yearly briefing on the risks of lasers and automatic safety cut-offs that switch off dangerous lasers the moment people come within their range.

Discos must also consult a laser safety engineer who will make regular checks to ensure that equipment is working safely and that protective measures have been undertaken.

So entertainment technology is to be supervised more strictly to ensure that acoustical and optical risks are kept to within reasonable levels.

Ernst O. Weger

(Mannheimer Morgen, 23 November 1981)

Mars probe

Continued from page 9

key to a greater insight into the ori[gin] of the solar system.

Kepler is the name given to the pro[jected] jected Mars satellite. It could be laun[ch]ed by an Ariane 3 rocket in 1989 [or] 1990. It would be the first all-Europ[ean] space probe.

Its purpose, as currently envisa[ged] would be to investigate the make-up [of] the Martian atmosphere, to ana[lyse] Mars's field of gravity and its struc[tural] irregularities, to survey the Mar[tian] magnetic field and to probe the in[flu]ence of solar wind on Mars's atmosph[ere] and ionosphere.

To carry out these tasks the pr[obe] would need to be put into an extrem[e] elliptical orbit at altitudes ranging fr[om] 200 and 6,750 kilometres.

The orbit would also need to be at [an] angle to the Martian equator so as [to] take the satellite nearer the po[lar] regions.

But plans have yet to be finalised. [A] decision on whether or not the E[SA] countries are to go ahead with the pr[o]ject is unlikely to be reached before [the] second half of next year.

Hermann Michael-Hahn/dl

(Mannheimer Morgen, 17 November 19[81])

Industry up in arms over pollution plans

New atmospheric pollution regulations for industry are due for approval by the Bonn Cabinet next spring, says Interior Minister Gerhart Baum.

He was answering journalists' queries before a Bonn hearing on the proposed regulations attended by industrial, trade union and environmental protection experts.

Industry, he said, was most unhappy with the proposals and protesting vociferously. But he hoped to gain the support of the *Länder* to get the new regulations through the Bundesrat.

In the Bundestag, or lower house, the coalition of Social and Free Democrats has a clear majority. In the Bundesrat, or upper house, it does not.

The Confederation of German Industries (BDI) feels the proposals, aimed to protect man, animals and historic monuments from atmospheric pollution, will jeopardise the country's future as an industrial location.

Planning procedures stood to be made so complicated that virtually any industrial investment in the Federal Republic of Germany would be an incalculable risk.

Even companies that planned to modernise outdated installations by introducing technology that was environmentally preferable would in future be required to show that the changes would in no way harm sensitive flora and fauna.

This, says, Herr Baum is rubbish. Environmental protection is not a brake on investment and the new regulations take into account the latest findings on, say, sulphur dioxide.

Sulphur dioxide has been found to devastate woods and forests by making rainfall acid. Yet sulphur dioxide danger levels were not nominally being amended.

All the new regulations envisaged was stricter enforcement. Measurements were to be taken over an area of one squ[are] kilometre, as opposed to four by fo[ur] which should result in a 30-per-ce[nt] improvement in pollution levels.

Herr Baum was confident substan[tial] headway would result from a provisi[on] by which companies would be autho[r]ised to build new factories in heavily in[]dustrialised areas if they agreed to equ[ip] existing installations with filtratio[n] devices or, for that matter, closed the[m] down.

The Trades Union Confederatio[n] (DGB) in its commentary at the heari[ng] called for even stricter regulations. It s[us]pects companies of stockpiling old a[nd] environmentally unsafe factories to e[x]change in return for planning permi[s]sion to build new installations.

There was certainly a risk of old fac[]tories being kept going longer th[an] made economic sense with some s[uch] aim in view.

The unions also call for more speci[fic] regulations on how old factories are [to] be equipped with devices to reduce [at]mospheric pollution.

Environmentalists claim that pro[vi]sions for flora and fauna in nature [re]serves and green belts amount to p[er]mission to exterminate plants and a[ni]mals outside these designated areas.

Even if the new regulations w[ere] strictly enforced not only the fore[sts] would be in danger; there would also [be] a residual danger of health hazards [to] man, as an Interior Ministry hearing [in] Berlin had been told in 1978.

Environmentalists also call on H[err] Baum to abandon the policy of tall fa[c]tory chimneys as a means of limiti[ng] atmospheric pollution.

This policy merely ensured that poll[u]tion was blown away from built-up are[as] into more distant parts of the country.

Gerda Strack

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 23 November 19[81])

THE ARTS

People still read Zweig despite the critics

WELT am SONNTAG

[Ste]fan Zweig, novelist and biographer, [w]as born in Vienna 100 years ago. [Perse]cuted by the Nazis, he emigrated in [193]8 and committed suicide in Brazil in [194]2.

[A]mong the famous authors of the [recen]t past Zweig, 1881-1942, has receded [from] the limelight a little.

[Hi]s books are still in print, both in [har]dcover and in paperback. They re[gular]ly run into new editions and re[main] popular with the wider reading [publi]c.

[Bu]t literary critics and academic au[thori]ties on German literature pay him [litt]le attention.

[The]y may write at length on other [Viennese] writers of his generation, such [as] Arthur Schnitzler, Hugo von Hof[manns]thal and Franz Werfel, but Stefan [Zweig] seems to be given a wide berth.

[Do]nald A. Prater, his British biogra[pher], deals with this phenomenon in the [open]ing chapter of his *Stefan Zweig*, [publi]shed in German by Hanser, Mu[nich], at DM48.

The most striking pointer to this neg[lect] of Zweig is that the standard biog[raph]y was written not in Germany but [in E]ngland nine years ago.

[It] has been translated into German to [mar]k his birth centenary on 28 Novem[ber]. Prater, in collaboration with Volker [Mich]els, has also written an illustrated [biog]raphy.

[Pu]blished as an Insel paperback at [DM]16, it is entitled *Stefan Zweig: Leben [und] Werk im Bild.*

[A] revised edition of his corrrespond[ence] with Friderike, his wife, is also [now] in print after an absence of 30 [years]. Quoted extensively by Prater, it is [publi]shed by Scherz at DM29.80 and en[title]d *Unrast der Liebe.*

[Fo]r readers who might prefer a Stefan [Zwei]g reader, his publishers, Fischer, [hav]e published at DM25 a hard-cover [compi]ler of his short stories, letters and [essay]s entitled *Das Stefan-Zweig-Buch.*

[Wil]l his centenary mark the begin[ning] of a Zweig renaissance comparable [to th]e revival of interest in Schnitzler 20 [year]s ago?

[Sh]ort stories such as *Amok*, *Verwir[run]g der Gefühle*, *Angst* and *Schach-No[vel]le* hold the reader's attention by vir[tue] of their psychological verve.

[Hi]s biographies, such as *Maria Stuart*, *[Eras]mus von Rotterdam*, *Drei Meister* [(Bal]zac, Dickens and Dostoyevsky) and *[Heil]ung durch den Geist*, likewise owe [thei]r success to a psychological feeling [for] the leading figures of cultural his[tory].

[I]n the last-named biography he deals [wit]h the master to whom he owes the [mos]t valuable part of his stock in trade, [the] psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud.

Freud reluctantly, but with ungrudg[ing] admiration of Zweig's literary bril[lian]ce, accepted him as a pupil. Their [pers]onal ties were cordial.

Zweig was always a literary man of [the] world. He was on friendly terms [wit]h leading intellectuals in countries all [ove]r Europe.

His closer acquaintances included Romain Rolland and Maxim Gorki. Then there was the Munich composer Richard Strauss, for whom he wrote the libretto to *Die Schweigsame Frau*, which was then boycotted by the Nazis.

His friends included musicians Bruno Walter, from Berlin, and Arturo Toscanini, of Italy. Then there was Frans Masereel, the Belgian painter, and so many more.

Prater tells a fascinating tale of a cosmopolitan man of letters who was almost always successful.

Zweig had apartments not only in Vienna and Salzburg but also in London and Paris.

Prater also deals with his dilemma as an impassioned European, a humanist and a pacifist. Zweig is well known to have extricated himself from the Austro-Hungarian military machine in World War I and set up a group of international peace-lovers in Switzerland, a group led by him and Romain Rolland.

His biographer admits that in 1914, when the First World War broke out, even Zweig, the cosmopolitan, was swept along by the wave of patrotism to begin with.

It was a while before he decided he must be a European and a pacifist, but once he had opted for humanism he preferred, after 1918, not to commit himself on party-political or local issues.

That, too, was why he chose not to return to Vienna but to set up house with his wife Friderike in Salzburg.

He later left Austria because of something that happened in Salzburg. The local authorities hit on the absurd idea, after a 1934 uprising, of searching Zweig's home for a machine gun.

In the Zurich-bound train he met Robert Neumann, who was also on his way into exile, and said he was afraid the non-existent machine gun might start firing one day.

The search, incidentally, was ordered by Arthur Seyss-Inquart, head of the Austrian Nazi government that held power for a short time before the 1938 *Anschluss*.

Seyss-Inquart was later to gain greater notoriety as a Third Reich Nazi leader.

Leaving Salzburg dealt a severe blow to Zweig's marriage; Friderike stayed in the city until 1938.

She was a remarkable personality, assistant and writer in her own right. The two first met in a garden wine restaurant near Vienna in 1908.

She was married to a young diplomat at the time and wrote him an anonymous letter that opens their correspondence. They soon began to live as man and wife.

But a divorce was out of the question in pre war Austria and special dispensation proved extremely difficult in the post-war Republic.

They finally married at the Vienna registry office in 1919. Friderike did not turn up for the ceremony. She was known to be Zweig's companion of long years' standing.

She was represented by a man, the poet Felix Braun. "How did you get on in the wedding night?" she wrote in a letter penned after the ceremony.

Prater's fascinating description of a brilliant literary life is somewhat marred by Annelie Hohenemser's translation into German.

Stefan Zweig ... standard biography written in English. (Photo: IP)

Schönborn Park, Vienna, is consistently misnamed in translation as "Schönborner Park." The Dolomites are said to be in the vicinity of Merano.

Instead of *on* Kapuzinerberg, the part of Salzburg where the Zweigs lived, the German translation persistently says *in* Kapuzinerberg, as though it were a place name and not, as in fact it is, a hill.

In the description of the registry office marriage ceremony we are suddenly confronted with a *Magistratspfarrer*, or municpal chaplain, who seems out of place in a civil ceremony.

And when, in connection with Freud, mention is made of analysis by ordinary people, the reference, one assumes, must be to lay analysis.

But only someone well versed in psychoanalytic techniques is likely to realise what the original reference must have been. More careful editing would have been preferable.

In exile Zweig, the man of the world, all the world's friend, takes a turn for the tragic. Emotional confusion (the title of one of his books) befell him first at 50, then at 60.

Friderike furnished his new home in London but he shared it with Lotte Altmann, 28 years his junior, who was first his secretary.

She was later, during the war, to become his wide, and in 1942, in Brazil, she committed suicide with him.

Many questions have been asked as to his suicide. Zweig certainly seems to have suffered increasingly serious bouts of depression in exile; he was not beset by material hardship of any kind.

Unlike other emigrés he was a rich man even in exile in South America. His books earned ample royalties in all major languages.

Then two shocks hit him simultaneously. He and Lotte watched the carnival in Rio, which was ablaze with life. And the news came through that Singapore had fallen to the Japanese, meaning the war was sure to last much longer.

In his last major work, *Die Welt von gestern*, he dealt with Austria before Hitler. Bidding the world of yesterday goodbye, he felt unable to believe there would be a tomorrow.

He and Lotte in their home in a Rio suburb that seemed so reassuringly far away from the war took an overdose of Veronal on 22 February 1942.

He remained famous even in death. The Brazilian government laid on a state funeral for him.

Otto F. Beer

(Welt am Sonntag, 22 November 1981)

Gerhard Marcks: tradition craftsmanship, nature

Hannoversche Allgemeine

Gerhard Marcks, the sculptor, has died at 93 in Burgbrohl, near Bonn, after a stroke. He was one of the most important German sculptors of the century.

He was considered a conservative man in his views and work. He worked almost until his death. One of his last works was a statue of the Greek god Prometheus.

In a way his life had turned full circle. He served his apprenticeship in Berlin, his native city, under Scheibe and Kolbe, and even then had felt bound by the traditions of the Ancient World.

His love of Ancient Greece made him a conservative who, in the early years of the century, arrived at a strict form that went beyond naturalism.

It is frequently forgotten that Marcks worked for a time at the Bauhaus in Weimar, the most advanced art centre of the 20s.

Gropius appointed him head of pottery. He later worked at Burg Giebichenstein art college in Halle.

In Weimar he exchanged ideas with Gropius and Feininger but personally preferred expressionism to constructivism.

This brought him into contact with Ernst Barlach, who in the 30s arranged for him to sculpt statues in St Catherine's, Lübeck.



Gerhard Marcks ... love of Ancient Greece. (Photo: Hans-Jürgen Wohlfahrt)

By this time he had already been sacked by the Nazis and his work classified by them as degenerate. He returned to Berlin in 1934.

In retrospect Marcks can be seen to have survived the Nazi era better than many other artists. He was a realist but not a man to conform and go in for Germanic motifs.

He remained realistic, a sculptor of men and animals who as a young man had been stricken with despair on seeing finches caged in a zoo.

Cologne offered him a house as a home and studio. In 1952 he was award-

Continued on page 12

■ THE CINEMA

A cosy weekend watching Scandinavian films

There are various reasons why, over the years, Lübeck's Scandinavian film festival has built up an intimate, friendly atmosphere.

Only Scandinavian films are shown, and the selection is small. The whole show lasts just one weekend and there is always a team of Scandinavian film journalists.

Lübeck is in fact a meeting place for Scandinavian film institutes. Debates and conferences are held there.

Lübeck is, in a way, the hub of the industry in Scandinavia. Many an internal squabble has been aired in the city.

This year's festival was the 23rd. It concluded as an additional feature a retrospective featuring the young Ingrid Bergman.

There was also a review of films for children.

One interesting point that came to light was the struggle of Danish makers with the censor.

Children's films are often rejected on the grounds that they ar unsuitable; for example, *The Story of Kim Skov*, by Hans-Henrik Jorgensen which deals with violence among school children.

Several films shown in Lübeck were conspicuously "international"; but this does not mean that their national character was watered down. On the contrary, it must be seen as an enrichment.

Films like Michael Raeburn's *African Tragedy* and Dusan Makaveyev's *Montenegro* have little that is Scandinavian about them — except of course that they are Swedish productions or co-productions.

African Tragedy is the film version taken in Zambia of a novel by Doris Lessing which describes the decline of a white farmer's family in South Africa and the ambivalent relationship of a white woman with her black houseboy.

The film was directed with a somewhat heavy hand and is weighed down by literature. But towards the end (once the viewer has come to accept the film's traditional style) there is some stark drama.

Montenegro, which had already been presented at the Cannes Festival, is quite different. It is a fresh, surrealistic farce full of punchlines and witty gags.

It deals with a middle class woman who, against her will, is drawn into a circle of eccentric Yugoslavs living in Sweden.

Montenegro is the Yugoslav director's first film since *Mysteries of the Organism* (1971).

Vilgot Sjöman's *I Blush* is a further attempt by a Scandinavian film maker to get away from the well-trodden path. The hero is a director by the name of Gunnar Sjöman who goes to the Philippines to prepare a film project. There, he meets a woman delegate of the Swedish branch of Amnesty International who is searching for a political prisoner.

The film is a spoof on Western clichés (particularly prevalent among film makers) about the Third World. Parts are funny and hit the nail on the head; but by and large the film has been put together crudely and pretentiously and leaves the viewer with mixed feelings about it.

In the end, it was the "traditional" Scandinavian films that impressed most, among them *Little Ida* by the Norwegian Laila Mikkelsen.

The film shows the experiences of a little girl during the German occupation of Norway. Her mother has an affair with a German officer and works in the kitchens of a POW camp for Russians.

The girl is treated as an outsider by the other children, and eventually her mother gets rid of her by finding foster parents.

On liberation day, the child wants to be in on the parade of the people, but a woman from her neighbourhood stops her. She slaps the girl and takes away her necklace of small Norwegian flags.

A simultaneous montage shows the mother being seized and having her head shaved.

There is no ideological commentary whatsoever, just detached observation and reporting.

Sally and Freedom, a Swedish film by Gunnel Lindblom, tells the story of a woman who, after ten years of marriage, leaves her husband and tries to stand on her own feet. It is very conventional. The characters are depicted as being representative of specific problems.

Even so, the work of Scandinvian film makers is remarkable. They dominate what can be described as the most interesting sector of the Scandinavian movie industry.

Among the films to be mentioned in this category is *Persecution* by the Norwegian Anja Breien. The film deals with the witch hunts in 17th century Norway.

I Am Also Like This by the Dane Lise Roos portrays an 18-year-old girl, a character that has served the director in two previous films.

In trying to compare the films of the individual Scandinavian countries, the first conspicuous thing that comes to mind is that Sweden dominates numerically but that the most novel and unusual of the films shown in Lübeck came from Denmark.

This, for instance, applies to the documentaries *Tomas — A Child out of Reach*, dealing with a mentally handicapped child and his mother; *American Scenes* by Jacob Holdt; and the sensitive and fantastic feature film *Next Stop Paradise* by Jon Bang Carlsen.

This film deals with a woman who lives in a old people's home but for whom life is not yet over.

The festival indicates that Scandinavian film makers are making much progress in tryng to break away from the well-trodden path of Nordic themes and find a new style and new subjects.

Ulrich Gregor

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 21 November 1981)



Bringing back the memories . . . Ingrid Bergman in 'Vier Gesellen', 1938. (Photo: Nordische Film)

Gerhard Marcks

Continued from page 11

ed the Pour le mérite, an unusual honour for a artist in Germany.

He did much work commissioned by the public sector, including portraits of Heuss and Adenauer, the memorial at Ohlsdorf cemetery, Hamburg, the *Bremer Stadtmusikanten* statue (a Grimm's fairy tale scene) in Bremen and bronze doors, including the door of the Marktkirche in Hanover.

Craftsmanship, tradition and nature was one of his mottos; it could well be applied to his oeuvre as a whole.

Ten years ago he donated to Bremen much of his work: 350 statues, 5,000 drawings and about 400 prints. They are kept in a gatehouse that now bears his name.

So Marcks had a museum of his own in his own lifetime. He was an artist and an unusually severe man, critical of himself and his work.

To fellow-artists he was given to quoting Goethe, wo wrote:

"In vain will unbounden spirits strive for the perfection of pure height. Those who aim to achieve greatness must pull themselves together. Self-restraint is the sign of a master; the law alone can give us freedom."

Ursula Bode

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 14 November 1981)

Documentary technique is criticised

Those who came to the Duisburg film festival, devoted to documentaries for the past two years, to see new productions were disappointed.

A well arranged six-day programme presented 25 films (a selection from 110) and only four were premieres.

The rest had been shown on television or in cinemas or both.

In *Zwischen den Bildern — Montage im dokumentarischen Film* (Between the Pictures — Montage in Documentary Film) Heide Breitel and Hans-Helmut Prinzler simplified the possibilities of montage, as the subsequent heated discussion showed.

Rhythmic montage that operates by formal criteria was described by some film makers as ideologically wrong while the method some film makers use in observing people was said to be ideologically correct.

This questionable and yet fascinating film criticises interviews in documentaries on the grounds that they strip people of their emotions and convey a false impression.

This widespread method is also used in *Matte Wetter — Arbeit unter Tage* (Matte Wetter — Work in a Mine) by Christoph Hübner, Theo Janssen, Werner Ruzicka and Gabriele Voss.

They succeeded in conveying something of the miners lives, except when they did interviews.

With this film, which was, incidentally, well received, and with most other productions it seems reasonable to ask: why make a film at all if what matters most is not be pictures but the words?

This must have been going through Werner Biedermann's mind when he made *Des Lebens ganze Fülle oder Das goldene Zeitalter* (The Fullness of Life or the Golden Age) in which he created a montage of old amateur and educational films of the 1930s and 1940s with background music by Chopin.

One of the most refreshing films was *Oh Horn! — Albert Mangelsdorff Posaune* (Oh Horn! — Albert Mangelsdorff Trombone) by Lucie Herrmann.

She shows excerpts from the musician's concerts and has him tell about his work.

The film convinces through the emotional presence of Albert Mangelsdorff and the cinematic form which, as so frequently happens, is grafted onto the subject.

The fact that there are some weaknesses is clearly due to lack of money.

There was a shortage at the festival of such original films despite some we[...] spots) make without regard for the pub[...]lic but out of pure love of cinema [...] work.

Instead, there were a great many [...] minute TV productions like the con[tro]versial *Im Turm — Hausbesetzer [in] Kreuzberg* (In the Tower — Squatters [in] Kreuzberg) by Wieland Backes from [the] series *Unter deutschen Dächern* (Un[der] German Roofs).

The programme committee later [said] that the film was shown because [it] showed how to make a 45-min[ute] movie.

But the argument fails to hold w[ater] when one considers that the film *M[ün]chen Höckerstrasse 33* (33 Höckerstr[asse] Munich) in the same series ma[naged] without a single word being spoken.

The Backes film seems to have [an] alibi function considering that there [are] interesting films available on the [squat]ter problem, none of which the jury [con]sidered worthy of inclusion.

It seems that the organisers wante[d to] present a programme that would [not] hurt anybody's feelings.

The Duisburg festival is financed [by] the city and the North Rhine-West[pha]lia Education Ministry, but its surviv[al is] still dicey.

Stjepo Pavlin

(Der Tagesspiegel, 22 November [1981])

[M]EDICINE

[E]xercise helps as long as you don't drop dead

[...], jogging, wind-surfing and [oth]er leisure time sports are healthy. [M]oderation and regularity are essen[tial].

[Prof]essor Liesen of the Cologne [...] Academy has told a seminar on [the pro]s and cons of leisure time sports [a]s part of the *Medica 81* congress) [th]ose over 40 should first have a [thoroug]h medical checkup. Liesen: "The [...] in such sports can have a big[ger eff]ect on the human organism than pharmaceuticals."

[...] middle-age people must adapt [...]ly to fitness programmes, Dr La[...], of Cologne, told the seminar. [...] who are out of practice, especial[ly ...] with undiscovered cardio-vascu[lar dis]orders, could be at risk even when [doing] simple things such as morning [gymna]stics.

[...] Lagerström illustrated this by [...] "A 70-year-old lifting a case of [...] clearly overtaxed."

[...] people forget to warm up and [lim]ber up thoroughly first. Most injuries, [La]gerström said, come about when [people] like skiers, for instance, step off [a] lift with stiff joints and instantly [go] down a slope.

[...] doctors at the seminar agreed [...]surance sports such as ski hiking [do] most good.

[A cro]ss-country ski school specialising [in coro]nary cases has proved its worth [not on]ly as exercise for heart attack pa[tients] but also with neurotics, Professor [...] told the seminar.

[...] of the patients are neurotics, he [...]

[This] puts doctors in a difficult posi[tion b]ecause they are reluctant to pre[scribe] tranquilisers, which have been [under a]ttack for some time, and former[ly re]commended psychotherapeutic methods have not stood up to medical scrutiny.

Professor Reimer said that treatment with a small number of drugs and above all modern behavioural therapy held considerable promise. In any event, the days when a doctor could tell a patient "there's nothing wrong with you" were over.

The value of this major international congress lies in the dissemination of knowledge that can be applied in practice.

For instance: hormone therapy preceded by a thorough diagnoses frequently enables the doctor to stop the loss of hair or stimulate its growth in the bald-headed.

Using slides, Professor Zaun demonstrated the progress that has been made in this field. He said that air transplants held little promise of success and that the same applied to the many hair tonics on the market.

Cosmetic surgery, Professor Schüle told the congress, can have a positive effect on the psychological condition of the patient.

People who go out of their way to acquire a tan, either naturally or under a sunlamp, Professor Jung said, ran the risk of premature ageing or cancer.


It is no secret that the vaunted school stress originates in the parental home because of exaggerated expectations on the part of the parents.

Professor Michaelis even went so far as to suggest that certain talents in a child who was not motivated by his environment could actually lead to a handicap.

Early diagnosis and motivation programmes for children, the principal of a school for handicapped children said, must be developed in this country.

Karlheinz Welkens

(Rheinische Post, 20 November 1981)



Getting rid of pain

The piece of equipment treats pain through magnetic field therapy. The Pamatron 2000 was on show at an exhibition in Düsseldorf. (Photo: dpa)

Breakthrough in treatment of malignant tumours

Researchers have for the first time succeeded in injecting toxic substances into tumour cells of animals and in subsequently killing the tumour. The toxic substances are coupled to certain antibodies that attack only tumour cells. This could mean that our entire cancer therapy will have to be revised.

American researchers used such combinations of antibodies and toxic substances in leukemia experiments with mice — and they, too, succeeded in destroying the cancer cells.

A congress held at the Hamburg University Hospital, Eppendorf, attended by more than 100 scientists from all parts of the world has dealt with the latest findings and possibilities of cancer therapy.

Hamburg Hospital researchers of the Immunology and Urology Department have dealt with the causes and treatment of cancer of the bladder. Their research has now progressed to the point where the results of animal experiments can be applied to humans.

"Researchers throughout the world have evolved theories on the causes and therapy of cancer which must now be applied in practice," Professor Heinz-Günter Thiele told the meeting.

The experiments of the past few years show that lectins (proteins that induce clumping of red blood cells) play a major role here. They can "recognise" certain forms of sugar residue in the cells and attach themselves to this residue. Some lectins are like a key: they fit only specific types of sugar and cells.

Since the sugar residue of benign and malignant cells differs, lectin enables doctors to track down cancer cells.

Incidentally, certain bacteria causing infectious diseases also use lectin to gain access to cells.

The differences in the sugar residue also provide information on why certain bacteria attack specific organs. The answer is simple: the lectin key of the bacteria fits only a particular "cell lock".

Vegetable and bacteria lectins can thus be used as potent cell poisons.

The breakthrough in experimental cancer therapy lies in the fact that the toxic parts of the lectin can be coupled to the antibody of a specific type of tumour and can thus be infiltrated in the malignant cell. As a result, Professor Thiele, lectin research is one of the main objectives world-wide.

The Hamburg congress (the third one of its kind in the Federal Republic of Germany) has led to a lively exchange of ideas between cell biologists and doctors.

Hamburg's research team has been dealing with this problem for the past four years. Its work has been financed by the German Research Community, the Cancer Fund, the Bonn Research Ministry and the Volkswagen Foundation.

Gisela Schütte

(Die Welt, 20 November 1981)

Researchers elaborate on link between stress and cancer

[Psyc]hological stress is a contributory [cau]se of cancer, but cannot alone [...], according to a research team.

[The t]eam rejects the widespread con[tention] that mental stress and even a [...] atmosphere in the home by them[selves a]re carcinogenic.

[The] findings were published in the [...] journal, *Ärztliche Praxis*.

[In the] article, the leader of the Heidel[berg-ba]sed interdisciplinary team, Dr [...] Grossarth-Maticek, said the con[clusion] was that these factors can in[crease] the incidence of cancer but only [in con]junction with other factors.

[Even] people with the most unfavou[rable p]sychological make-up will not de[velop c]ancer unless there are purely me[dical ri]sk factors in evidence, he wrote.

[The] Heidelberg team began its work [in Yu]goslavia as far back as 1963 when [it stu]died groups of cancer patients and [compar]ed them with a healthy control [group].

[Start]ing from 1972 similar work was [carried] out in Heidelberg.

[The] number of persons involved was [...] in Yugoslavia and 1,026 in Hei[delber]g.

[The] researchers recorded not only the [psych]o-social data and major events in [the liv]es of the test persons but also the [...] of their sleep, smoking habits, [use] of drugs, body weight, blood [pressu]re, cholesterol, etc.

Dr Grossarth-Maticek described the psycho-social factors that increase the risk of cancer provided there are other risk elements: "We work on the sociological assumption that cancer patients have throughout their lives occupied themselves with psychologically traumatic events in the parental home or with exaggerated expectations on the part of their parents.

"Frequently, the atmosphere in the parental home was cold and loveless. The parents gave their children no opportunity to express their emotions — be they rage or love. This has led to subsequent massive inhibitions in expressing emotions and needs.

"Conflicts are avoided and the patient creates an artificial harmony. His own wishes and needs are completely repressed. In our view, this is the most important psycho-social risk factor in cancer."

If traumatic evemts are constantly suppressed from consciousness, the Heidelberg researchers say, the thus-induced stress affects the regulatory mechanism of the brain and the body's immunological defence system.

Continuous stress weakens the defence system and this, in turn, can promote the growth of malignant tumours.

Dr Grossarth-Maticek is still unable to say how these mechanisms function.

To explore this, further studies in conjunction with sociologists, molecular biologists, biochemists and epidemiologists will be necessary. Only complex statistical methods will make it possible to establish risk constellations for cancer, and this is likely to take a number of years.

But Dr Grossarth-Maticek has already developed a "programme therapy" aimed at helping cancer patients who are unable to express their emotions and needs.

"The therapist must ensure that the patient is not confronted with insights into his own psychological make-up that would overtax him and with which he is unable to cope.

"In the long term, the patient must learn to express his needs. Certain harmful behavioural attitudes can sometimes be eliminated through hypnosis."

(Bremer Nachrichten, 16 November 1981)

■ BEHAVIOUR

Youth thumbs nose at big stick of authority

Young Germans are no longer prepared blindly to accept authority, according to a study.

This is surprising in view of a study published a year ago, according to which there is a considerable neo-fascist potential among the 12 to 18-year-olds.

Yet the latest study coincides with the findings of a major survey by Gerda Lederer of New York who concludes that the change of attitude in the Federal Republic of Germany is more pronounced than in the USA: democratic and anti-authoritarian ideas are more deep-rooted among German high school students than among Americans.

Comparisons with a study in 1945, the Donald McGranahan Study, show that Germany's youth 35 years ago accepted authority much more readily than its opposite number in America.

But this does not mean that young Americans are now submissive in the face of authority and less democracy conscious.

The reason for the change, Mrs Lederer says, is that the endorsement of democratic and anti-authoritarian values has risen only slightly among America's young while the rise in Germany over the past 35 years has been dramatic.

The trend analysis for America was based on the McGranahan Study a survey carried out by a Turkish psychologist on the authoritarian way of thinking among Turkish and American juveniles as well as the Lederer Study.

The German survey was also based on the 1945 data of the McGranahan Study plus an opinion survey made by the Emnid Institute in 1963 and the findings of Gerda Lederer.

Mrs Lederer, an American born in Vienna, was prompted to carry out her study by her experience as a guest teacher at a Hamburg high school. The survey, which was funded by the Scientific Research Association is soon to be published in book form by Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen.

Mrs Lederer found German secondary school students as being much freer, more casual and more undisciplined than Americans.

But the real surprise, Gerda Lederer writes in the magazine *Psychologie heute* (10/81), turned out to be the teachers. Though they do not welcome the attitudes of their students, they accept and tolerate them in a non-authoritarian way.

Another reason for the study was the general scepticism in the USA. Nobody was prepared to believe her impressions.

There has been a basic change in fundamental values and attitudes in the Federal Republic of Germany, says Mrs Lederer. This change has largely gone unnoticed in the United States and is therefore not taken into account when it comes to presenting a realistic picture of Germany.

The German survey involved 925 juveniles in various types of secondary and vocational schools. The American high school students whom Mrs Lederer interviewed in 1978 were mostly from California, Tennessee and New York. But the survey is representative because it involved youngsters from all social backgrounds in both countries, different types of school and different geographic regions.



The American and German juveniles were given identical questionnaires; preliminary tests were carried out to ensure that there were no differences of nuances in the questions.

The questions themselves dealt with various types of authority such as state, school and society.

Surveys of this kind always run the risk of producing the answers considered desirable.

To find out whether the juveniles actually conveyed their own views and not what parents, school and the media uphold as virtues, the questionaires contained specific "control questions".

Their evaluation showed that the youngsters actually voiced their own convictions.

Many of them added their own comments or refused to answer certain questions.

All this has been carefully recorded and analysed.

The conclusion: Questions that were regarded as being stupid and pointless were treated accordingly by Germany's young. This included the question: "Do you think that the Germans as a whole are (a) better than; (b) about the same, as; (c) worse than the following nationalities? (there followed a list of ten nationalities). About 12 per cent of the Americans refused to answer these and similar questions. Among the Germans, 21 per cent did not answer these questions or wrote in comments like "all people are equal" or "there is no such thing as Germans nd Italians" or simply "cliché!"

Such attitudes naturally have to do with the degree to which a person is susceptible to authoritarianism and undemocratic tendencies. The less aut... tarian a test person the more fre... such critical comments or refusals to... swer.

Renate J. Mresch...

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 14 November...)

Listening on the grape vine

A publican in the Bavarian town of Stephanskirchen, ... Rosenheim, wanted a telephone box with flair: so he simply ... away part of a wine cask. Now his customers can p... anywhere in the world. The girl is just a lifelike do... traditional costume to lend atmosphere. (Photo: ...)

Staff told to inform on 'drinkers'

A German company has officially begun an informer system to reveal alcoholics on the staff.

The aim of the scheme is to get to the problem and help before it is too late.

The Voith firm in Heidenheim has issued a pamphlet which outlines some symptoms of alcoholism and says: "The desire to help has nothing to do with informing on a fellow staff member."

It warns against reluctance to say anything out of sympathy for the drinker.

Ninety per cent of adult Germans drink moderately to regularly and only five per cent are teetotal; another five per cent are alcoholics, says Herbert Ziegler, director of the German Anti-Addiction Society.

There are an estimated 1.8m alcoholics in this country. Their social decline usually begins at work when they receive the first warning.

But the threat of dismissal is as questionable a remedy as the prescription of castor oil for a cough. All that happens is that the patient does not dare cough for a while... but then he starts up again with a vengeance.

Dismissal oftens follows the second warning, and so begins the decline of the alcoholic despite all well-meant advice and admonishment at work.

Voith has for the past five years been trying to break this vicious circle. The warning against excessive consumption always goes hand in hand with an offer of concrete help.

The person concerned can talk it out with specially selected staff members who provide counselling on an honorary basis. These counsellors are supported by the entire staff — ranging from works council to management.

But even in Heidenheim the alcoholic is made to realise the fact that he is sick and that only treatment as an out-or in-patient can help.

When a department head at Voith feels that one of his staff members depends on alcohol he first has a man-to-man talk with him. If he considers it necessary, he cam ask one of the honorary counsellors to attend the discussion.

The employee need not fear dismissal. This type of chat entails no job consequences.

But should he continue drinking excessively, the first talk is followed by an "extended discussion", attended by a member of the personnel department and of the works council in addition to the department head and counsellor.

Depending on the outcome of this, the personnel department and the counselling service prepare a specific offer of help.

This can range from outpatient counselling or medical treatment all the way to an all-out drying-out cure.

The employee has eight weeks in which to make up his mind. Should he again overindulge, the department head tells after getting the personnel officer and works council approval, issues another warning, again together with the offer of help.

Only after the second warning must the employee with a drinking problem accept the offer of help or face dismissal.

If he accepts help and if there is no relapse there will also be no disciplinary consequences.

Gisela Langensee, who planned and developed the Heidenheim model, says that while there have been no great successes there has nevertheless been progress in the form of small steps.

The main problem is for the drinker to recognise his affliction in good ... To start with, every alcoholic is ... run-of-the-mill consumer of liquo... he is usually particularly popular i... company.

Herr Ziegler stresses that alco... are frequently "conspicuously incon...uous". But they are always there ... there is a party in progress; and ... they do become conspicuous they t... cure themselves of excessive drin... mostly unsuccessfully.

The Voith brochure lists a numbe... symptoms marking the beginning o... coholism, among them: heavy drin... at parties; the need for alcohol in ... early morning hours; trembling, swe... a restlessness when there is nothin... drink; frequent leaving of the ... place (mostly at regular intervals)... punctuality; diminishing perform... towards the end of the work day;... quent absenteeism on days befor... after the weekend; and the steadfas... nial of excessive consumption or a... siveness when the subject is mentione...

The pamphlet stresses, however, ... this only applies if these symptoms ... been observed over a long period ... that the same symptoms may mean ... solutely nothing in some cases.

The brochure warns fellow-wo... against being reluctant to mentio... symptoms out of sympathy for the ... son concerned.

As one ex-alcoholic puts it: "Wha... need is a kick in the pants."

Ziegler stresses the problems al... lics have in switching from one ... pheral group (alcoholics) to an... (teetotalers). The fact is that teeto... meet with as much animosity as ... coholics.

And in a company this can go ... as to prompt some people to put ... of alcohol into an ex-alcoholic's ... juice.

Annegert ...

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 14 Novembe...)

...OCIETY

Tommy Atkins's bit of Germany remains forever England

...e thousand British soldiers and ...are based in the Federal Republic ...many and the British sector of ... So are 76,000 dependents. How ...y get on with the Germans? What ... like in the BAOR and RAF ...y?

...barracks in Gremmendorf, Mün...er, are mostly old red-brick build... The long corridor on the second ...ading to typical unmarried men's ... has an air of institutional ...

...e tall wooden doors on both ... The walls are whitewashed. At ... there are niches that look like ...s or stands for billiard cues.

...ades ago they were lined with ...acht officers' rifles. Now the ...s are home, for a three-year post... British servicemen in Germany. ...s are virtually identical. Pin-ups ...the bare white walls, in corners by ..., which are separated by small ...ds.

...nster sits in his cage. The TV is ... one corner. A squaddie wearing ...ones is absorbed in rock music. ... is asleep and looks even youn...ep than he does in denims.

...t Anderson, 19, is a typical ... soldier. He joined the army at ... posted to Germany at 17 and is ...ed. His official role is to deter ...rsaw Pact from attacking the ...

... one of 55,000 men based in ...y with the Rhine Army or RAF ...y and stationed in North Rhine-...alia, Lower Saxony and Berlin.

... there are 76,000 dependents: ...nd children. And 28,000 support ...el in civilian jobs.

...BAOR is an army based in a for...untry that cost the British tax... more than £1.2bn in the 1979/80 ...al year alone.

...Anderson as a single man is in ...jority; 60 per cent of BAOR men ...arried. His working day runs in ...ccordance with military routine.

...ille is at 6.30, breakfast at 6.45 ...ade at 8. Then he services tanks. ... is at 12.30, followed by more ...ea is at 17.15.

... dinner he is occasionally on ... duty and could possibly be on ...kind of punishment roster. But as ... his time is his own in the ...gs.

...ingle men that means either the ... the mess, in quarters or out of ...s and into the uncertain and less ...able world outside: the world of ...rmans.

...t is where problems start. To ...unicate with the locals, BAOR ...s really have to learn German.

...he same time they have to come ...s with being left very much to ...elves in barracks and maybe feel... homesick for their families and ...

...ritish boy soldier sent to Germany ... many important facts of life for ...st time on his first overseas post...

... is a combination of military dis... at work and personal responsibil...ter hours. It includes lessons that ...d enough to learn back home.

... home in Scotland, in Pte Ander... case, he would have grown up among friends and in a familiar environment.

In Germany he is very much on his own in a foreign country. Many of his teenage counterparts learn the little they know about Germany from loitering near the railway station to kill time.

For the married men, or pads, as they are known, life after hours mean going home to the family. It is obviously a different matter altogether.

Basil Barden has served 35 years in the army. He is a sergeant-major and an old hand. He knows most of the regimental postings from past experience.

As a raw recruit he once lived as a lodger with a German family in a previous garrison town. He has been with the second-largest regiment in the BAOR, in Münster, since 1975.

As a married man he is no longer a lodger; he has married quarters, a pad of his own. He pays DM200 a month in rent.

BAOR married quarters consist of about 28,000 permanent houses and apartments and 2,000 rented quarters. Most were built to British specifications.

Matthew Warnock, 23, broke out of this BAOR ghetto by chance, as it were. He got to know a local girl, they fell in love and married on 7 September 1979.

The BAOR proudly claims that 10 per cent of its men are married to German wives. It is an impressive figure, but marriage, even a mixed marriage, does not end the problems that are encountered.

Officials are well aware that the language barrier is the most serious handicap that prevents British and Germans from getting to know each other better.

Before being posted to Germany, servicemen are put through a two-month crash course to learn the basics about Germany, the Germans and their language.

Basic German is also taught compulsorily when they first arrive in Germany. Any further language courses are voluntary.

Small wonder that British servicemen prefer to keep to themselves, drinking the beer they drink back home, speaking English, their native language.

They seldom go out of camp for a drink or to the disco. When they do so they usually go out in groups; it makes them feel more sure of themselves. After a few beers they often feel too sure of themselves and get mixed up in a bar brawl after stirring up old arguments with and about the Krauts, as they call the Germans. "It's because of the way the army runs things," says Anderson. The BAOR provides everything the serviceman and his family needs.

At Rheindahlen, the BAOR GHQ near Mönchengladbach, British servicemen and their families live in entire suburbs of their own.

In Münster there are 5,000 British servicemen, 4,800 dependents and 300 attached personnel. The BAOR runs nine barracks, eight kindergartens, five primary schools, a senior school, five youth clubs, four churches, a cinema, three bookshops, four Naafi stores and a British military hospital.

Then there are the messes and unit bars in every barracks, the women's clubs, the sports clubs. There is the BFBS with TV and radio round the clock.

"When I need to buy clothes for the family I don't go to German shops," says Ann Barden. "I buy by mail order from England just like everyone else."

So it is equally unsurprising that British servicemen can be recognised by the cut of their clothes and not just by their haircuts and general bearing.

Despite the difficulties most British servicemen seem happy with life in Germany. "Would I like to go back home? Not likely. Not at the moment anyhow," most would say.

They feel the quality of life is better over here. Everything is organised. The streets are cleaner. People are more disciplined.

Why, they tend their gardens beautifully, they sweep the pavement in front of their homes regularly in summer and clear the snow with equal regularity in winter.



Bonn President Karl Carstens takes the salute during a visit to the Coldstream Guards, part of Britain's Rhineland force in Germany. (Photo: dpa)

Arguments like these are usually advanced when BAOR personnel are asked why life in Germany is better than back home in Blighty.

"With the Germans everything is either black or white," says Sgt-Major Barden. "There is no grey zone in between like we have back home."

This is a mentality the military man is bound to admire.

Since 1979 school-leavers have queued outside the Army recruiting offices in Britain. Times have changed since the days when a career in the forces was the last way out for those who stood no chance of making the grade in civvy street.

But unemployment, especially juvenile unemployment, has increased so alarmingly that more and more youngsters, especially school-leavers, are opting for a safe job in the armed forces.

"Most new recruits," says Sgt-Major Barden, "come to Germany just for the good life. They have long forgotten our basic military role."

The good life, as he sees it (Sgt-Major Barden is in charge of a 90-man squadron), includes not only higher pay than back home but also a host of other privileges.

Petrol, drink and tobacco cost half the British price. There is six weeks' home leave per year, including a free flight and six free British Rail warrants to anywhere in the UK.

"The best saving of all is to buy yourself a duty-free car," says Warnock.

"The standard of young recruits has declined in recent years," Barden is convinced, although all BAOR regiments are now back to full strength and there is no lack of volunteers.

"But discipline and trouble with drink are getting worse and worse," says Warnock, who works in a military prison.

Servicemen always have the end of their three-year posting in heir mind's eye and are often simply not interested in integrating with the Germans.

"The army is getting more and more like a kindergarten," says Anderson.

Yet all are agreed that they would not, under any circumstances, want to become German. They are proud of being British.

Very few servicemen stay on in Germany when they leave the forces. "It is extremely difficult to get the two most arrogant nations in Europe together," one British officer says.

That, at any rate, is how he accounts for the strangely sheltered, ghetto-like lives British servicemen lead in Germany.

Christian Langer

(Vorwärts, 12 November 1981)